Stop-payment dishonour under cheque law remains actionable; liability and rebuttal of presumption are matters for trial, not quashing.

Stop-payment dishonour does not by itself take a cheque complaint outside Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the statutory presumption under Section 139 continues to apply. At the quashing stage, the court examines only whether the complaint allegations and pre-summoning material disclose a case for summoning, not whether the accused can ultimately rebut liability. Questions about absence of a pre-existing debt, sufficiency of funds, and the reasons for stopping payment are matters for defence evidence. On that basis, the complaint and summoning order were not liable to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

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Issues: Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the summoning order could be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the ground that the cheque was dishonoured on account of stop payment instructions and that there was no pre-existing debt or liability.

Analysis: The complaint alleged issuance of cheques towards discharge of liability and their dishonour with the remark that payment had been stopped by the drawer. At the quashing stage, the Court was required to see only whether the complaint allegations and pre-summoning material made out a case for summoning. The settled law was that dishonour on stop payment instructions does not, by itself, take the matter outside Section 138. The statutory presumption under Section 139 applies, and the accused must rebut it by showing sufficient funds and valid reasons for stopping payment. Whether there was no liability or whether the accused could rebut the presumption are matters for defence evidence, not for quashing.

Conclusion: The complaint and summoning order were not liable to be quashed, and the petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 failed.

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