Discretionary depletion allowance for timber rights upheld where the Minister acted on relevant considerations and not arbitrarily.

A fiscal provision empowering the Minister to make a depletion allowance for timber limits "as he deems just and fair" conferred discretion both whether to grant any allowance and, if so, its amount. The statutory wording and amendment history showed that mandatory language had been replaced by permissive language, so there was no legal duty to make an allowance. The Minister's refusal was also upheld because it rested on a relevant and intelligible view that the irrecoverable capital cost had already been recouped, and the decision was bona fide, non-arbitrary, and within the lawful bounds of discretion.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Minister was legally bound to grant a depletion allowance for timber limits under the statute, or whether he had a discretion to refuse any allowance at all; (ii) whether the Minister's refusal of the allowance was a valid exercise of statutory discretion.

Issue (i): Whether the Minister was legally bound to grant a depletion allowance for timber limits under the statute, or whether he had a discretion to refuse any allowance at all.

Analysis: The statutory language used permissive words, not compulsory ones. The provision empowered the Minister to make such allowance for exhaustion of timber limits as he deemed just and fair, which conferred a discretion both to decide whether any allowance should be made and, if so, to determine its amount. The statutory context and the prior amendment reinforced that the legislature had intentionally substituted discretionary wording for mandatory wording.

Conclusion: The Minister was not under any legal obligation to make a depletion allowance; the power was discretionary.

Issue (ii): Whether the Minister's refusal of the allowance was a valid exercise of statutory discretion.

Analysis: The Minister proceeded on a tenable view that the only irrecoverable capital cost associated with the timber rights had already been fully recouped through prior allowances. That approach was held to be intelligible, relevant, and within the bounds of the discretion conferred by the statute. The governing principle applied was that a court does not interfere with a statutory discretion if it is exercised bona fide, without irrelevant considerations, and not arbitrarily or illegally.

Conclusion: The refusal of the allowance was a valid exercise of discretion and called for no judicial interference.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the statute gave the Minister a discretion to decline a depletion allowance, and the Minister's decision was within the lawful bounds of that discretion.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a fiscal provision confers on the Minister a power to make an allowance as he deems just and fair, the power is discretionary as to both entitlement and quantum, and a court will not interfere with the resulting decision if it is bona fide, based on relevant considerations, and not arbitrary or illegal.

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