Restoration applications filed after limitation without condonation fail where prior knowledge of dismissal is shown.

Restoration of a matter dismissed for default must be sought within thirty days, and an application filed beyond that period requires a separate prayer for condonation of delay. Where the record showed earlier knowledge of dismissal through service and appearance in execution proceedings, the later restoration applications could not be treated as made within time or supported by sufficient cause. The court also rejected a lenient approach based only on the respondent being a government undertaking, noting contradictions in its version and the absence of a proper explanation. In supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, the restoration order was set aside for ignoring material facts and acting with patent perversity.

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Issues: Whether the restoration orders could be sustained when the applications were filed beyond limitation without a prayer for condonation of delay and the record showed prior knowledge of dismissal.

Analysis: The prescribed period for restoration of a matter dismissed for default is thirty days from the date of dismissal. The record showed that the respondent had been served in execution proceedings, had appeared through counsel, and was therefore aware of the dismissal much earlier than the date asserted in the restoration applications. The applications were filed long after the limitation period, yet no separate delay condonation application or prayer was made. The impugned order proceeded on an erroneous assumption that the respondent, being a government undertaking, deserved a lenient approach, despite contradictions in its version and the absence of sufficient cause. In supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, interference was warranted because the subordinate court had failed to consider material facts and had acted with patent perversity.

Conclusion: The restoration order was unsustainable and deserved to be set aside.

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