Concurrent sentencing under criminal procedure depends on judicial discretion and cannot be sought through a fresh final-stage application.

Section 427(1) of the Code creates a general rule that a later sentence runs consecutively unless the court directs concurrency, and the discretion to order concurrent sentences is case-specific rather than governed by fixed exhaustive rules. The factors relevant to that discretion include the nature and gravity of the offences, whether they arise from a single transaction, and the offender's antecedents and personal circumstances. The provision is intended to mitigate hardship, but it does not displace the normal consecutive-sentence rule. A separate application under Sections 482 and 427 after the convictions and appeal process have attained finality is not maintainable.

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Issues: Whether the power to direct sentences awarded in different convictions to run concurrently under Section 427(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is governed by any fixed principles, and whether such a direction can be sought by a separate application after the conviction and appeal process is over.

Analysis: Section 427(1) lays down the normal rule that a subsequent sentence commences after the previous sentence expires, unless the Court directs concurrency. Section 31 of the Code similarly contemplates consecutive sentences, subject to a direction to the contrary where multiple offences are tried together. The decision survey shows that concurrency is a matter of judicial discretion to be exercised at the trial, appellate, or revisional stage, depending on relevant factors such as the nature and gravity of the offences, whether the offences arise from a single transaction, the offender's criminal record, age, sex, and whether the offender is habitual. Section 427 is intended to afford amelioration to prisoners, but that consideration does not displace the normal rule of consecutive operation. The Court also held that, in view of the later Supreme Court authority, a separate application under Sections 482 and 427 after the convictions have attained finality is not maintainable.

Conclusion: The discretion under Section 427(1) is real but not guided by exhaustive fixed rules, and it must be exercised on case-specific considerations at the proper stage; a fresh independent application after final disposal of the criminal proceedings is not maintainable.

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