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Issues: (i) whether a company-complainant, being a juristic person, could substitute its representative during the proceedings; (ii) whether an affidavit filed as examination-in-chief under Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 becomes legal evidence when the deponent does not submit to cross-examination, and whether a remand could be ordered for fresh evidence.
Issue (i): whether a company-complainant, being a juristic person, could substitute its representative during the proceedings.
Analysis: A company acts through a living representative in criminal proceedings. The choice of such representative is for the company, and there is no legal compulsion that the same individual who initiated the complaint must continue throughout. Where the earlier representative ceased to be associated with the company, substitution of another authorised person was permissible. The complainant remained the same de jure complainant, while the representative only changed in a de facto capacity.
Conclusion: The substitution of the complainant's representative was valid and not a ground to defeat the prosecution.
Issue (ii): whether an affidavit filed as examination-in-chief under Section 145 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 becomes legal evidence when the deponent does not submit to cross-examination, and whether a remand could be ordered for fresh evidence.
Analysis: Affidavit evidence under Section 145 is subject to the accused's right to summon and examine the deponent. Evidence in a criminal trial must be capable of testing by cross-examination, and a statement that is not so tested does not become complete legal evidence. Here, the original deponent did not appear for cross-examination despite opportunities, and the substituted representative gave no substantive evidence on the facts in issue. The Court also found that the complainant failed to establish the ingredients of the offence under Section 138. In such circumstances, a retrial was not warranted merely because of improper or incomplete evidence.
Conclusion: The affidavit evidence unsupported by cross-examination could not sustain the complaint, and remand was refused.
Final Conclusion: The complainant failed to prove the prosecution case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the acquittal was sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, affidavit evidence of the complainant does not by itself constitute complete legal evidence unless the deponent is available for cross-examination, and a company may substitute its authorised representative during the proceedings without invalidating the complaint.