Concurrent findings and continuous readiness to perform govern specific performance; unpleaded part performance cannot rescue the claim.

In second appeal, concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed by reappreciation of evidence under Section 100 CPC, so the High Court could not overturn the decree on that basis. Specific performance requires pleading and proof of continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, and the plaintiff had failed to establish that requirement. A belated, unpleaded plea of part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act could not be entertained, and in any event willingness to perform remained essential. The High Court's interference was therefore unsustainable, and the decree dismissing the suit for specific performance was restored.

---

---

Issues: Whether the High Court, in second appeal, could interfere with concurrent findings of fact and decree specific performance by accepting a plea of part performance and readiness and willingness not supported by the pleadings or evidence.

Analysis: The jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is confined to substantial questions of law, and concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed by reappreciation of evidence. The trial court and first appellate court had concurrently found that time was of the essence, that the plaintiff had failed to prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract, and that the alleged subsequent agreement was false and fabricated. The plea under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was neither pleaded nor raised before the courts below and, in any event, could not succeed because willingness to perform is an essential ingredient of part performance. In a suit for specific performance, Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 requires averment and proof of readiness and willingness throughout, which was absent here.

Conclusion: The High Court's interference was unsustainable, and the decree for specific performance could not be maintained.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the concurrent decree dismissing the suit for specific performance and granting relief to the opposite side was restored.

Ratio Decidendi: In second appeal, concurrent findings of fact cannot be reversed by reappreciation of evidence, and a decree for specific performance cannot be granted unless the plaintiff has pleaded and proved continuous readiness and willingness; a belated, unpleaded plea of part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 cannot be entertained.

---