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Issues: (i) Whether the revisional authority was justified in setting aside the Sub-Divisional Officer's finding and restoring the finding that the land was leased for cultivation of sugarcane. (ii) Whether Section 43A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 could apply where the lease was granted to a single person, having regard to the use of the expressions "any bodies or persons".
Issue (i): Whether the revisional authority was justified in setting aside the Sub-Divisional Officer's finding and restoring the finding that the land was leased for cultivation of sugarcane.
Analysis: The finding of the Sub-Divisional Officer was held to be perverse because it rejected evidence without assigning reasons and applied a standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, whereas the proceeding was governed by preponderance of probability. The Tribunal had considered the landlord's evidence as well as record entries and concluded that the lease was for sugarcane cultivation. A revisional authority may interfere where a finding is perverse, unsupported by relevant material, or based on irrelevant material.
Conclusion: The revisional authority was justified in interfering, and the finding that the land was leased for cultivation of sugarcane was restored in favour of the appellants.
Issue (ii): Whether Section 43A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 could apply where the lease was granted to a single person, having regard to the use of the expressions "any bodies or persons".
Analysis: The expression "persons" in Section 43A(1)(b) was read in light of Section 13 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, which provides that words in the singular include the plural and vice versa unless the subject or context repels such construction. No contextual repugnancy was found. The plural form used in the provision did not justify excluding a lease granted to one person, and a contrary view would defeat the purpose of the provision.
Conclusion: Section 43A applied even to a lease granted to a single person, and the High Court's contrary view was incorrect.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Tribunal's order restoring the finding against the High Court's interference was reinstated.
Ratio Decidendi: A revisional court may interfere with a patently perverse finding, and statutory words in the singular include the plural unless the context shows a contrary intent.