Prior sanction and cognizance under corruption law: Section 156(3) investigation barred without sanction, but different office at cognizance removes protection.
Prior sanction under the corruption law was treated as a bar that operates before cognizance, so a court cannot direct further investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code without valid sanction against a public servant. The protection, however, depends on the office alleged to have been abused at the time cognizance is taken: if the accused no longer holds that office and is serving in a different capacity, sanction is not required. Applying these principles, the challenge to the proceedings failed and the quashing petitions remained dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether an order directing further investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be passed against a public servant in the absence of valid sanction under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act; (ii) Whether a public servant who has been transferred to a different post, while remaining in public service, loses the protection of Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Issue (i): Whether an order directing further investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be passed against a public servant in the absence of valid sanction under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Analysis: The statutory bar on cognizance in Section 19(1) was held to extend to the stage where the court directs investigation under Section 156(3), because such a direction is at the pre-cognizance stage and forms part of the court's exercise of judicial power on the complaint. The prior decisions relied upon established that cognizance is not confined to issuance of process, and that a magistrate cannot invoke Section 156(3) against a public servant where the mandatory sanction required by the corruption statute is absent.
Conclusion: The question was answered in the negative; an order directing further investigation under Section 156(3) cannot be passed in the absence of valid sanction.
Issue (ii): Whether a public servant who has been transferred to a different post, while remaining in public service, loses the protection of Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Analysis: The protection attached to sanction depends on the office alleged to have been abused and the stage of cognizance. The earlier decisions applied the test that if, on the date of cognizance, the accused no longer held the same office, or was holding a different office in a different capacity, sanction was not required. The relevant inquiry is whether the alleged misconduct is connected with the very office held when cognizance is taken, not whether the person continues to be a public servant in some other post.
Conclusion: The question was answered against the appellants; no sanction was required because they were not holding the office alleged to have been abused when cognizance was taken.
Final Conclusion: The appeals failed. The challenge to the proceedings did not succeed, and the dismissal of the quashing petitions was sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution requiring prior sanction, a court cannot direct investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 without valid sanction, but sanction is unnecessary where the accused public servant, on the date of cognizance, holds a different office from the one allegedly abused.
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