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Issues: (i) Whether, after bail has been granted and new cognizable non-bailable offences are added, the earlier bail must necessarily be cancelled before the accused can be taken into custody; (ii) whether re-registration of the FIR by the National Investigation Agency amounted to an impermissible second FIR and whether the Agency could continue further investigation after filing of the charge-sheet and taking of cognizance; (iii) whether, after cognizance had already been taken, the accused could be remanded under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or only under Section 309(2) of that Code.
Issue (i): Whether, after bail has been granted and new cognizable non-bailable offences are added, the earlier bail must necessarily be cancelled before the accused can be taken into custody.
Analysis: The addition of graver offences does not automatically extinguish the earlier bail in every case, but the court has power under Sections 437(5) and 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to direct arrest and custody. The accused may seek fresh bail for the newly added offences, and the investigating agency may move the court for custody. The facts here showed that the accused was produced before the Special Judge on a production warrant while already in custody in another case, so the court-controlled production and remand did not require prior cancellation of the earlier bail as a mandatory precondition.
Conclusion: The earlier bail did not have to be cancelled first in the facts of this case, and the challenge on this issue failed.
Issue (ii): Whether re-registration of the FIR by the National Investigation Agency amounted to an impermissible second FIR and whether the Agency could continue further investigation after filing of the charge-sheet and taking of cognizance.
Analysis: A second FIR is barred only where it is a fresh case on the same occurrence in the sense prohibited by the settled criminal procedure doctrine. Here, the Central Government had directed the National Investigation Agency under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 to take up the scheduled offences under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Re-registration was only a procedural step to give effect to the statutory transfer of investigation, and not a fresh FIR in the forbidden sense. Further investigation remained permissible under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 even after the earlier report and cognizance, especially because the scheduled offences were added later and had not formed part of the earlier charge-sheet.
Conclusion: Re-registration was not a second FIR, and the National Investigation Agency could lawfully continue further investigation and submit a supplementary report.
Issue (iii): Whether, after cognizance had already been taken, the accused could be remanded under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or only under Section 309(2) of that Code.
Analysis: Section 167 applies at the investigation stage before cognizance, while Section 309(2) governs remand after cognizance in an inquiry or trial. Where cognizance has already been taken and the accused was before the court in custody, remand must be treated as one under Section 309(2). In the present case, the accused had been produced before the Special Judge pursuant to a production warrant, and the order of remand, though not expressly citing the provision, was legally sustainable as a remand under Section 309(2). The High Court's view that the order rested on Section 167 was incorrect, but the remand itself was not illegal.
Conclusion: The accused could be remanded only under Section 309(2) in these circumstances, and the remand order was upheld on that basis.
Final Conclusion: The appeals were found to lack merit, and the impugned judgment was maintained because the custody, re-registration of the FIR, further investigation, and remand were all held to be legally sustainable on the facts of the case.
Ratio Decidendi: After cognizance, remand of an accused already before the court lies under Section 309(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, while further investigation under Section 173(8) remains permissible and a re-registration made to implement a statutory transfer of investigation is not a second FIR.