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Issues: Whether the acquittal in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was liable to be reversed on the ground that the accused had not adduced positive evidence to rebut the statutory presumption, and whether the material on record showed that the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
Analysis: The complainant's case rested on the existence of a loan advanced to the accused's husband and on the cheque being issued either as guarantor or as security, but the versions were inconsistent. The promissory note said to evidence the debt was not produced, the attestors were not examined, and no books of account or income-tax returns were filed to prove the alleged debt. The accused entered the witness box, disputed the alleged borrowing, and relied on documentary circumstances, including the notice demanding return of the blank cheque. On the material on record, the statutory presumption under Section 139 stood rebutted on a preponderance of probabilities, and the trial court's appreciation of evidence was not shown to be perverse.
Conclusion: The acquittal was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.
Final Conclusion: In an appeal against acquittal, interference is unwarranted where the accused has rebutted the statutory presumption by probabilities arising from the record and the trial court's view is a reasonable one.
Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the accused may rebut the presumption under Section 139 on a preponderance of probabilities from the material on record, and an appellate court will not disturb a reasonable acquittal where two views are possible.