Inherent jurisdiction permits restitution and is not treated as a Code application for limitation purposes.

Restitution could be ordered under the court's inherent power in Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 where Section 144 did not strictly apply, because the money had been withdrawn through the court process and return was needed to restore the parties to their original position. An invocation of inherent jurisdiction was also held not to be an application under the Code for Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, so the motion was not time-barred on that basis. The petitioners were therefore entitled to recover the withdrawn amount with appropriate interest and costs.

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Issues: (i) Whether restitution could be granted in exercise of the court's inherent power where Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 did not in terms apply; (ii) Whether an application invoking inherent power was governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issue (i): Whether restitution could be granted in exercise of the court's inherent power where Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 did not in terms apply.

Analysis: Section 144 applies to cases where a decree or order is varied or reversed and restitution follows as a consequence. The claim here arose from money withdrawn during the pendency of the suit under a statutory deposit made to obtain the benefit of stay of trial, and not from reversal of the decree itself. The court held that the inherent power saved by Section 151 of the Code could be invoked to restore the parties to their original position where money had been withdrawn through the court's process and the decree had not provided for its return.

Conclusion: Restitution was maintainable in exercise of the court's inherent power and not confined to Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (ii): Whether an application invoking inherent power was governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 had historically been treated as confined to applications under the Code, and the same reasoning was examined in the setting of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The court held that Section 151 does not create a substantive right to apply; it merely recognises the court's inherent power. An invocation of that power is therefore not an application under the Code in the sense contemplated by Article 137. Since no enforceable right to apply as of course accrues to a party for exercise of inherent jurisdiction, the article does not govern such a motion.

Conclusion: The application was not barred by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded, the restitution claim was entertained under inherent jurisdiction, and the petitioners were granted recovery of the withdrawn amount with appropriate interest and costs.

Ratio Decidendi: A motion invoking the court's inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is not an application under the Code for purposes of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and restitution may be ordered to prevent unjust enrichment where Section 144 does not directly apply.

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