Computation of time from a decree date excludes the day named, making the deposit timely and defeating execution.

The rule for computing a decree period expressed as running "from today" excludes the day of the decree, because the meaning of "from" in the General Clauses Act was treated as reflecting a general principle applicable to decrees as well as statutes. Applying that method, the three-month period was reckoned by leaving out the decree date, so the judgment-debtor's deposit made on 18 July 1933 fell within time. The consequence was that the execution application could not be maintained.

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Issues: Whether, in computing the period of three months fixed by the decree using the expression "from today", the day of the decree was to be excluded, and whether the deposit made on 18 July 1933 was within time.

Analysis: The expression "from" in the General Clauses Act was treated as excluding the day named, and that rule was regarded as embodying a general principle applicable to decrees as well as statutes. The Court held that the period commencing from the date of the decree was to be reckoned by excluding that day. On that basis, the deposit made by the judgment-debtor fell within the stipulated three months.

Conclusion: The deposit was within time and the execution application was not maintainable.

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