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Issues: (i) Whether the Foreign Exchange Regulation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1969 operated retrospectively so as to validate action for a declaration made before the amendment under Section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and thereby sustain confiscation and penalty under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. (ii) Whether the impugned confiscation and personal penalty could be sustained under Section 167(37) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 read with Sections 29 and 137 of that Act, and whether refund of the penalty amount was justified as consequential relief.
Issue (i): Whether the Foreign Exchange Regulation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1969 operated retrospectively so as to validate action for a declaration made before the amendment under Section 12(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and thereby sustain confiscation and penalty under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878.
Analysis: The amended requirement that the export declaration be true in all material particulars was held to be prospective. The applicable rule was the pre-amendment law as construed by the Supreme Court, under which the exporter's obligation was only to furnish the prescribed declaration under Section 12(1). On that construction, a false declaration did not by itself attract Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. The Court further applied the settled principle that a fiscal or penal provision imposing a burden or creating an offence is not to be construed retrospectively absent clear language, particularly where the transaction was already completed before the amendment.
Conclusion: The amendment did not operate retrospectively, and the order could not be sustained under Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878.
Issue (ii): Whether the impugned confiscation and personal penalty could be sustained under Section 167(37) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 read with Sections 29 and 137 of that Act, and whether refund of the penalty amount was justified as consequential relief.
Analysis: The order of confiscation was founded on both Section 167(8) and Section 167(37). The findings of misdescription and incorrect value, coupled with the statutory duty under Sections 29 and 137 to state the real value and particulars in the shipping bill, were sufficient to attract Section 167(37). Since the customs findings on that footing were not open to reappraisal in writ jurisdiction, the confiscation could not be quashed merely because the Section 167(8) basis failed. As to the personal penalty, however, the amount imposed far exceeded the maximum provided under Section 167(37) and was therefore referable to Section 167(8); once that basis failed, the penalty had to go. Refund of the penalty amount was allowed as ancillary relief following the quashing of the unlawful penalty, while refund of the larger amount paid for redemption of the confiscated goods was not warranted.
Conclusion: The confiscation was upheld, but the personal penalty of Rs. 35,000 was quashed and directed to be refunded.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only in part: the confiscation was maintained, the personal penalty was set aside, and the refund direction was confined to the penalty amount alone.
Ratio Decidendi: A later fiscal or penal amendment will not be construed retrospectively to create or enlarge liability for a completed transaction, and where a customs order rests on multiple statutory bases, the part supported by an independent valid provision may survive even if another basis fails.