Court dismisses application for writ of prohibition due to insufficient grounds, despite irregular actions by Income Tax Officer. Each party bears own costs.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the petitioners had not shown sufficient grounds for a writ of prohibition. Although the Income Tax Officer's actions were deemed irregular, the court did not see fit to grant extraordinary relief. Each party was directed to bear their own costs.

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Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer under Section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.
2. Validity of the notice issued under Section 34.
3. Authority of the High Court to issue writs against the Income Tax Commissioner.
4. Applicability of the Specific Relief Act.
5. Procedural objections regarding the application process.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer under Section 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922
The primary issue was whether the Income Tax Officer had jurisdiction to reopen an assessment under Section 34. The court noted that Section 34 allows reopening of assessments only if "income, profits or gains chargeable to income tax has escaped assessment." The court emphasized that the notice merely stating that the Income Tax Officer "has reason to believe" that income has escaped assessment was insufficient. The court held that the essential prerequisite for reopening an assessment under Section 34 is the existence of an item chargeable to income tax that has indeed escaped assessment. The court cited previous judgments, including *In re Lachhiram Basantlal* and *Rajendranath Mukerji v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bengal*, to support this interpretation.

2. Validity of the Notice Issued under Section 34
The notice issued on the 8th of February, 1934, stated that the Income Tax Officer had "reason to believe" that income had escaped assessment. The court found this statement inadequate, as Section 34 requires a factual basis that income has escaped assessment, not merely a belief. The court noted that the notice did not specify the heads of income that had escaped assessment, which was necessary to justify reopening the assessment. The court concluded that the Income Tax Officer could not give himself jurisdiction by an erroneous finding of fact.

3. Authority of the High Court to Issue Writs Against the Income Tax Commissioner
The court addressed whether it had the power to issue writs against the Income Tax Commissioner. The Advocate-General argued that the High Court had no jurisdiction in revenue matters, citing Clause 4 of the Charter establishing the Supreme Court at Fort William in Bengal and Section 106 of the Government of India Act. However, the court referred to the Privy Council decision in *Alcock, Ashdown and Company, Limited v. Chief Revenue Authority of Bombay*, which held that the High Court could compel a public officer to perform a statutory duty. The court also noted that the Specific Relief Act empowers the High Court to issue such orders.

4. Applicability of the Specific Relief Act
The petitioners invoked Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, seeking an order requiring the Commissioner to hear their complaint or to state a case. The court acknowledged that the Specific Relief Act allows the High Court to compel a public officer to perform a duty. However, the court emphasized that the Income Tax Act provided specific remedies, such as the power of revision under Section 33 and the ability to refer questions of law to the High Court under Section 66. The court held that the petitioners should have availed themselves of these remedies before seeking extraordinary relief.

5. Procedural Objections Regarding the Application Process
The Advocate-General raised procedural objections, arguing that the application should be heard by a Bench of at least two Judges and that it should have been presented under the Income Tax Act's provisions. The court dismissed these objections, stating that the application was for a writ of certiorari or prohibition, not a reference under the Income Tax Act. The court held that a single Judge on the Original Side had the authority to issue such writs under the powers conferred by the Charter.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the application, concluding that the petitioners had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for the issuance of a writ of prohibition. The court held that the Income Tax Officer's actions were irregular but did not warrant extraordinary relief. Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

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