Territorial jurisdiction, natural justice, merger, and statutory revocation governed the failed challenge to a mining grant.

Territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1A) was upheld because service of the effective orders at the petitioner's Calcutta address formed part of the cause of action, defeating the objection that the respondents were outside the Court's reach. The revocation of the mining grant was treated as void for breach of natural justice because it was made without a reasonable opportunity to show cause, although communication of the substance of the order was held sufficient. Relief was nevertheless barred because the revocation had merged in an unchallenged revisional order of the Central Government. The grant also stood revoked by operation of Rule 28A, as the lease had not been executed within the prescribed time.

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Issues: (i) whether the High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1A) of the Constitution of India when part of the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction; (ii) whether the revocation of the mining grant was invalid for breach of natural justice and for want of effective communication; (iii) whether the writ could succeed without challenging the Central Government's revisional order, having regard to the doctrine of merger; and (iv) whether the grant had already stood revoked by operation of Rule 28A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(1A) of the Constitution of India when part of the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction.

Analysis: Service of the effective orders at the petitioner's Calcutta address was held to give rise to a part of the cause of action within the territorial limits of the Court. On that basis, the amendment enlarging writ jurisdiction was applied to negative the objection that the respondents were outside jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The objection to territorial jurisdiction failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the revocation of the mining grant was invalid for breach of natural justice and for want of effective communication.

Analysis: The grant conferred a valuable right to obtain execution of the lease, and revocation on the footing of default required an objective determination and a reasonable opportunity to show cause. The revocation was made without such opportunity, and the Court treated the revocation as vitiated by breach of natural justice. The memo communicating the substance of the order was treated as sufficient communication of the revocation for legal purposes.

Conclusion: The revocation was void for breach of natural justice.

Issue (iii): Whether the writ could succeed without challenging the Central Government's revisional order, having regard to the doctrine of merger.

Analysis: The revocation was carried in revision to the Central Government, and the revisional order was neither challenged nor sought to be set aside. The Court held that the original revocation had merged in the revisional order and that the petitioner could not obtain relief against the consequential notice without impeaching the final revisional determination.

Conclusion: Relief was barred because the Central Government's revisional order remained unchallenged.

Issue (iv): Whether the grant had already stood revoked by operation of Rule 28A of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949.

Analysis: The formal lease had not been executed within the period prescribed by Rule 28A after the grant, and the statutory consequence of revocation followed by operation of law. That position left no subsisting legal foundation for the petitioner's claim, notwithstanding later correspondence or administrative steps.

Conclusion: The grant stood revoked by operation of law.

Final Conclusion: The challenge failed because the petitioner's foundational rights had already come to an end, and in any event the unchallenged revisional order prevented grant of relief against the impugned notice.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ petition challenging a consequential notice cannot succeed where the foundational order has merged into an unchallenged revisional order, and a mining grant may also cease by operation of the governing statutory rule when the lease is not executed within the prescribed time.

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