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Issues: (i) Whether the stipulation in Section 10A of the Divorce Act requiring spouses to have lived separately for two years before seeking divorce by mutual consent is unconstitutional and liable to be read down; (ii) whether the petitioners were entitled to a decree of divorce by mutual consent on the facts of the case.
Issue (i): Whether the stipulation in Section 10A of the Divorce Act requiring spouses to have lived separately for two years before seeking divorce by mutual consent is unconstitutional and liable to be read down.
Analysis: The provision introduced divorce by mutual consent for Christians, but imposed a two-year minimum period of separate residence unlike the one-year period under comparable matrimonial statutes. The Court held that statutory personal law measures enacted by Parliament remain subject to constitutional scrutiny under Article 13. It found no rational basis for subjecting Christians alone to a longer waiting period after the secular concept of mutual consent divorce had been extended across religious communities. The differential was held to be unrelated to the object of ensuring deliberation before dissolution and was therefore arbitrary and discriminatory. The Court also held that the longer waiting period imposed an unreasonable restraint on the right to life and personal autonomy under Article 21.
Conclusion: The two-year stipulation in Section 10A of the Divorce Act was declared unconstitutional under Articles 14 and 21 and was read down to one year.
Issue (ii): Whether the petitioners were entitled to a decree of divorce by mutual consent on the facts of the case.
Analysis: The spouses had been living separately for more than one year, and six months had elapsed from the date of presentation of the petition. Once the two-year requirement was read down, the statutory conditions for divorce by mutual consent stood satisfied.
Conclusion: The petitioners were held entitled to a decree of divorce by mutual consent.
Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the marriage was dissolved on the basis of mutual consent after treating the statutory separation period as one year.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory waiting period for mutual consent divorce that discriminates without a rational basis among similarly placed persons and imposes an arbitrary restraint on marital autonomy is violative of Articles 14 and 21 and may be read down to preserve the provision.
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