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Issues: Whether payment of money to a third person to withdraw from the contest, support a candidate, and canvass voters constituted bribery or corrupt practice under the election law.
Analysis: The payment was not made as consideration for votes promised or as a direct bargain for votes. The decisive requirement was a nexus between the gratification and the voter, such that the payment itself must directly or indirectly induce the elector to vote or refrain from voting. Mere payment to a third person for canvassing or persuasion, where the voters remain free to accept or reject the appeal, does not amount to bribery. The conduct found by the High Court fell within election propaganda and canvassing, not within the statutory concept of purchase of votes.
Conclusion: The finding of corrupt practice under Section 123(1)(A)(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 was unsustainable, and the appellant was not guilty of bribery.
Final Conclusion: The election petition basis for setting aside the election failed, and the High Court's order was set aside while the respondent found liable for bribery was also exonerated.
Ratio Decidendi: For bribery under the election law, the gratification must itself operate as a direct or indirect inducement to the voter, and payment to a third person for canvassing without proof that the payment purchased votes does not constitute corrupt practice.