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Issues: Whether, in computing the three-year period prescribed by the first proviso to Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the period during which acquisition proceedings remained stayed by a court order is to be excluded.
Analysis: The first proviso to Section 6(1) fixes a time-limit for making a declaration, but the proviso does not expressly deal with cases where proceedings are stayed by court order. The Court held that the equitable principle actus curiae neminem gravabit applies to such a situation, because a party should not suffer prejudice from the operation of a court's own order. It further held that where an initial declaration under Section 6(1) had in fact been made within time, the later quashing of that declaration did not erase the fact that the statutory requirement had already been satisfied. The period during which writ proceedings and the stay order remained in force was therefore liable to be excluded in reckoning the three-year period.
Conclusion: The stay period must be excluded in computing limitation under the first proviso to Section 6(1), and a declaration made within the extended period is valid.
Final Conclusion: The contrary view was rejected, the reference was answered in favour of the Government, and the writ petition challenging the acquisition declaration was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where statutory limitation for a governmental action runs during the pendency of proceedings stayed by a court, the stayed period is excluded on the principle that an act of court shall prejudice no one, unless the statute clearly forbids such exclusion.