Residential house exemption under civil procedure depends on actual occupation, not tenant possession or the source of letting.
The exemption for a non-agriculturist's main residential house under section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code of Civil Procedure applies only to the portion actually occupied by the judgment-debtor at the time of attachment. A part voluntarily let out to tenants is not treated as occupied by the debtor and remains attachable, and the same principle applies to an attached building let out to a tenant. The majority further held that compulsory letting under requisition or rehabilitation orders does not change the position, because the decisive test is actual occupation, not the source of the tenancy. A separate opinion agreed on voluntary letting but would preserve the exemption where the letting is imposed by a competent authority.
Issues: (i) Whether, under section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a part of a non-agriculturist judgment-debtor's main residential house that is let out to tenants can still be treated as occupied by him so as to remain exempt from attachment; (ii) whether the same result follows where the attached portion is a building attached to the main residential house and is let out to a tenant; (iii) whether the position changes when the letting is not voluntary but results from an order of a competent authority such as requisitioning or rehabilitation.
Issue (i): Whether, under section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a part of a non-agriculturist judgment-debtor's main residential house that is let out to tenants can still be treated as occupied by him so as to remain exempt from attachment.
Analysis: The exemption clause was read as a whole. The words "main residential house" were held to be controlled by the requirement that the house must be "occupied by him." Actual occupation, not constructive occupation, was treated as the governing test. A portion voluntarily let out to tenants was no longer in the debtor's occupation at the date of attachment, and the protective clause being an exception to the general rule of attachability had to receive strict construction.
Conclusion: The answer was in the negative; the portion let out to tenants is not exempt as being occupied by the judgment-debtor.
Issue (ii): Whether the same result follows where the attached portion is a building attached to the main residential house and is let out to a tenant.
Analysis: The same reasoning was applied to attached buildings. The clause did not permit the words "occupied by him" to be confined only to the main residential house while ignoring the attached building. If the attached portion is let out, it is in the tenant's occupation and not the debtor's occupation when attachment is levied.
Conclusion: The answer was in the negative; the let-out attached building is not treated as occupied by the judgment-debtor.
Issue (iii): Whether the position changes when the letting is not voluntary but results from an order of a competent authority such as requisitioning or rehabilitation.
Analysis: The majority held that the source of the tenancy did not alter the legal position. On the relevant date, if the portion sought to be attached was not in the debtor's occupation, the exemption did not apply. No legal distinction was accepted between voluntary letting and occupation arising from requisition or rehabilitation orders for the purpose of clause (ccc).
Conclusion: The answer was in the negative; non-voluntary letting does not preserve the exemption.
Final Conclusion: The majority construed the exemption narrowly and held that only the portion actually occupied by the judgment-debtor remains protected from attachment. The separate opinion disagreed only on the third issue and would have treated compulsory letting by a competent authority as not defeating occupation for the purpose of the exemption.
Ratio Decidendi: Under section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the exemption applies only to the part of the residential house that is actually in the judgment-debtor's occupation at the time of attachment, and a portion in the possession of a tenant is not deemed to be occupied by the debtor.
Dissenting Opinion: P.C. Pandit, J. agreed on the first two issues but held that where the letting is imposed by a competent authority and is not voluntary, the judgment-debtor should still be deemed to be in occupation of that portion, so the exemption would continue to apply on the third issue.
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