Election petition limitation turns on declaration date, with condonation available only on strict proof of sufficient cause.

Election petition limitation under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 runs from the date the candidate is declared elected by the Returning Officer, because Sections 79(f) and 67A treat that declaration as the operative date of election; a petition filed after the prescribed 45 days is time-barred. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to election petitions, and Section 5 may be invoked where sufficient cause is shown. Erroneous legal advice can justify condonation only if it is credibly supported by material showing competent, non-negligent advice and bona fide diligence; unsupported assertions are insufficient.

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Issues: (i) Whether the election petition was filed within time under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, read with Sections 67 and 67A of that Act; (ii) whether Section 29(2) and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied to an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951; (iii) whether sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay on the basis of erroneous legal advice.

Issue (i): Whether the election petition was filed within time under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, read with Sections 67 and 67A of that Act.

Analysis: The relevant starting point of limitation was held to be the date on which the candidate was declared elected by the Returning Officer. The definition of "returned candidate" in Section 79(f) and the deeming provision in Section 67A showed that the date of election was the date of declaration, not the later date of publication in the Official Gazette under Section 67. On the facts, the declaration was made on 23 February 1967 and the petition filed on 17 April 1967 was beyond the 45-day period.

Conclusion: The petition was held to be time-barred.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 29(2) and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applied to an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Analysis: An election petition was treated as an application and not as a suit in the strict sense. Since the special law prescribed a limitation period different from the Limitation Act, Section 29(2) was attracted. Section 5 was therefore available where sufficient cause was shown, and the absence of an express provision in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 excluding such application did not bar relief.

Conclusion: Section 29(2) and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were held applicable to election petitions.

Issue (iii): Whether sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay on the basis of erroneous legal advice.

Analysis: Mistaken legal advice may amount to sufficient cause only when the advice is shown to have been given by a competent person acting with reasonable care and without negligence. The application here contained no affidavit from the lawyer, did not explain how the advice was obtained or on what basis it was given, and did not satisfactorily establish bona fide mistake or reasonable diligence. The petitioner's own position as a legal practitioner also weighed against the claim for indulgence.

Conclusion: Sufficient cause was not made out and condonation of delay was refused.

Final Conclusion: The election petition was held to be barred by limitation, the request for condonation failed, and the petition was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: In election petitions, limitation runs from the date of declaration of election by the Returning Officer, and delay may be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 only on a clear showing of sufficient cause supported by material demonstrating bona fide, non-negligent legal advice or equivalent justification.

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