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Issues: (i) whether section 20 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 was unconstitutional as violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India; (ii) whether section 20 impermissibly curtailed the High Court's jurisdiction in winding up matters and conferred arbitrary power on the Board.
Issue (i): whether section 20 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 was unconstitutional as violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The provision was read in the setting of the Act as a whole and its object of timely detection, rehabilitation, and where necessary winding up of sick industrial companies. The Board functions as a judicial body composed of experts, bound to inquire into the matter, hear concerned parties, and record reasons before forwarding an opinion. The scheme does not permit arbitrary or unequal treatment between companies because action under section 20 depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and on the statutory test of whether revival is impossible and winding up is just and equitable.
Conclusion: The challenge under article 14 failed; section 20 was held not to be violative of article 14.
Issue (ii): whether section 20 impermissibly curtailed the High Court's jurisdiction in winding up matters and conferred arbitrary power on the Board.
Analysis: Section 20 was construed as part of a special statutory framework under which the Board's opinion only forms the basis for further winding up proceedings, which thereafter continue under the Companies Act, 1956. The High Court was not treated as wholly divested of its function, and the Board's recommendation was understood to carry weight because it is made after inquiry and reasons. Parliament was competent to modify the earlier winding up procedure through a later special enactment, and the interaction of sections 20 and 22 was viewed as necessary to prevent frustration of the rehabilitation scheme.
Conclusion: The contention that section 20 unlawfully restricted the High Court's jurisdiction or vested arbitrary power in the Board was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme in section 20 was upheld, the constitutional challenge failed, and the writ appeals were dismissed.