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Issues: Whether, on proof of receipt of money other than legal remuneration, the statutory presumption under section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act arose, what standard of proof was required to rebut that presumption, and whether the accused successfully proved that the amount received was a loan rather than illegal gratification.
Analysis: Proof that the accused received gratification other than legal remuneration was sufficient to attract the presumption under section 4(1). The accused was not required to disprove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the burden on him was only to establish his defence by a preponderance of probability. On the facts, the explanation that the sum was a loan was rejected, the surrounding circumstances supported the prosecution version, and even excluding the disputed statements there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.
Conclusion: The presumption under section 4(1) was correctly drawn, the defence was not proved on a balance of probabilities, and the conviction for offences under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was upheld against the accused.
Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the prosecution case of illegal gratification remained established and the sentence was not reduced.
Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution attracting section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, proof of receipt of gratification other than legal remuneration raises the statutory presumption, and the accused rebuts it only by proving a competing explanation on a preponderance of probability.