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Issues: (i) Whether the workman had proved continuous service of 240 days so as to attract the protection of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; (ii) Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the Tribunal's award and directing reinstatement on the basis of adverse inference drawn from non-production of muster rolls.
Issue (i): Whether the workman had proved continuous service of 240 days so as to attract the protection of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Analysis: The legal framework required the workman to establish that, in the twelve months preceding retrenchment, he had actually worked for 240 days so as to fall within the deeming fiction of continuous service under Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 do not strictly apply to industrial adjudication, but the basic principle that the claimant must prove the foundational facts of his case remains. The workman did not adduce sufficient evidence to establish completion of 240 days and did not summon or otherwise produce material such as muster rolls, appointment terms, or wage records to support the claim.
Conclusion: The workman failed to prove continuous service of 240 days, and the protection of Section 25F was not established.
Issue (ii): Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the Tribunal's award and directing reinstatement on the basis of adverse inference drawn from non-production of muster rolls.
Analysis: Adverse inference for non-production of evidence is discretionary and depends on the overall facts; it is not automatic. The Tribunal had not drawn any adverse inference, and that exercise of discretion was not shown to be illegal or irrational. In judicial review, the High Court could interfere only if the Tribunal's approach was unlawful or unreasonable. The High Court set aside the award solely on adverse inference without adequately addressing the absence of proof by the workman and without showing any legal infirmity in the Tribunal's reasoning. The cited precedents did not require an adverse inference in every case of non-production of documents, particularly where the claimant had not first laid the evidentiary foundation for his case.
Conclusion: The High Court was not justified in interfering with the Tribunal's award on the basis of adverse inference alone.
Final Conclusion: The award of the Industrial Tribunal was restored and the direction of reinstatement with back wages was set aside because the workman had not proved the requisite continuous service and the High Court exceeded the proper limits of judicial review.
Ratio Decidendi: In industrial adjudication, the workman bears the burden of proving completion of 240 days of service for the benefit of Section 25F, and adverse inference from non-production of employer records is discretionary and cannot, by itself, displace that burden or justify interference with a reasoned tribunal award.