Supreme Court clarifies saving provision: No notice under repealed law after repeal.

The Supreme Court held that no notice under Section 40 of the repealed 1973 Act could be issued after its repeal, as Section 61 of the 2003 Act only saved pending proceedings. The Court clarified that the intent of Section 61 was to save only ongoing matters and not initiate new proceedings under the old Act. The Court rejected the applicability of Section 61(2)(d) of the 2003 Act to the case and set aside the revisional order issued post-repeal.

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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the notice issued under Section 40 of the 1973 Act after its repeal.
2. Applicability of Section 61 of the 2003 Act in saving pending proceedings.
3. Interpretation of legislative intent regarding the repeal and saving clauses.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the notice issued under Section 40 of the 1973 Act after its repeal:
The petitioner challenged the order dated 15.5.2006 issued by the Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner under Section 40 of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 (1973 Act). The assessment for the year 2000-01 was framed on 16.1.2003, and a notice for revision was issued on 17.1.2006. The 1973 Act was repealed with the enactment of the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (2003 Act) effective from 1.4.2003. This Court in Hindustan Construction Company Limited vs State of Haryana opined that no notice under Section 40 of the 1973 Act could be issued after its repeal, as Section 61 of the 2003 Act only saved pending proceedings. The Supreme Court upheld this view, confirming that no fresh proceedings could be initiated under the repealed 1973 Act.

2. Applicability of Section 61 of the 2003 Act in saving pending proceedings:
Section 61 of the 2003 Act, both before and after its amendments in 2006 and 2010, was analyzed. The provision explicitly repealed the 1973 Act but saved pending proceedings. The Supreme Court observed that the repeal and saving clause in Section 61 of the 2003 Act saved only pending proceedings, and the intent was to give a quietus to matters that stood closed under the 1973 Act. The suo-moto revisional power under Section 40 of the 1973 Act could not be exercised after its repeal, as it was not a pending proceeding at the time of the enactment of the 2003 Act.

3. Interpretation of legislative intent regarding the repeal and saving clauses:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislative intent in Section 61 of the 2003 Act was to save only pending proceedings and not to allow the initiation of new ones under the repealed 1973 Act. The Court stated that any interpretation allowing the exercise of revisional power under Section 40 of the 1973 Act after its repeal would render the amendments to Section 61 redundant and lead to absurdity. The amendments made by Act No. 3 of 2010 were intended to address the limitations and constraints under Section 61, reinforcing that only pending proceedings were saved.

Conclusion:
The notice for revision issued on 15.5.2006, after the repeal of the 1973 Act, was without jurisdiction. The contention that Section 61(2)(d) of the 2003 Act applied to the petitioner's case was rejected, as this provision did not deal with the exercise of revisional power but only saved benefits granted to industrial units. The writ petition was allowed, and the revisional order dated 15.5.2006 was set aside.

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