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Issues: (i) Whether a revisional notice and order could be issued under Section 40 of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 after its repeal by the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 when no revisional proceedings were pending on the date of repeal; (ii) Whether Section 61(2)(d) of the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 saved the State's power to initiate such revisional proceedings in the case of industrial tax concessions.
Issue (i): Whether a revisional notice and order could be issued under Section 40 of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 after its repeal by the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 when no revisional proceedings were pending on the date of repeal.
Analysis: The repeal and saving provision in Section 61 of the 2003 Act preserved only pending proceedings and did not indicate any intention to reopen closed matters by initiating fresh revision after the repeal of the 1973 Act. The revisional notice was issued after the repeal had taken effect, and the earlier binding interpretation on the same saving clause was followed. Once the assessment had attained finality and no proceeding was pending on the relevant date, the revisional power under the repealed Act could not be newly exercised.
Conclusion: The revision proceedings and the revisional order were without jurisdiction and could not be sustained.
Issue (ii): Whether Section 61(2)(d) of the Haryana Value Added Tax Act, 2003 saved the State's power to initiate such revisional proceedings in the case of industrial tax concessions.
Analysis: Section 61(2)(d) preserves benefits relating to tax concessions for industrial units under Sections 13B and 25A of the 1973 Act and the rules framed thereunder. It does not deal with revisional jurisdiction or create a fresh power to initiate revision after repeal. The clause therefore could not be used to validate the impugned revisional action.
Conclusion: The contention based on Section 61(2)(d) was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, and the revisional order was set aside because the post-repeal revision was incompetent and the saving clause did not authorize fresh proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: After repeal of a taxing statute, a saving clause that preserves only pending proceedings does not authorize initiation of fresh revisional proceedings under the repealed Act.