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Issues: (i) Whether a subordinate criminal court has any inherent jurisdiction to recall an order dismissing a complaint for default in the absence of an express provision in the Criminal Procedure Code. (ii) Whether the law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 binds subordinate courts in pending proceedings and governs the present matter.
Issue (i): Whether a subordinate criminal court has any inherent jurisdiction to recall an order dismissing a complaint for default in the absence of an express provision in the Criminal Procedure Code.
Analysis: The Code permits dismissal of a complaint and discharge or acquittal of the accused where the complainant is absent, as reflected in Section 249 and Section 256(1). But once a complaint is dismissed and the magistrate has acted upon that order, the court becomes functus officio in relation to that dismissal unless the Code itself confers a power of recall or restoration. The filing of a second complaint is a different matter and cannot be equated with revival of a dismissed complaint. The subordinate criminal court has no general inherent jurisdiction to recall such an order.
Conclusion: The subordinate criminal court had no inherent jurisdiction to recall the dismissal order.
Issue (ii): Whether the law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 binds subordinate courts in pending proceedings and governs the present matter.
Analysis: Article 141 makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts within India. A declaration of law by the Supreme Court applies to pending proceedings and cannot be treated as having merely prospective effect unless the Court so indicates. The contrary view taken below misunderstood the reach of Article 141 and wrongly treated the Supreme Court's pronouncement as if it were limited to the parties before the Court. The binding declaration that subordinate criminal courts lack inherent power to recall such dismissal orders therefore governed the present controversy.
Conclusion: The law declared by the Supreme Court bound the subordinate courts and compelled restoration of the original dismissal order.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the impugned orders were set aside, and the original dismissal of the complaint was restored because subordinate criminal courts cannot recall such orders without statutory authority and the Supreme Court's declaration of law under Article 141 is binding in pending matters.
Ratio Decidendi: A subordinate criminal court has no inherent power to recall or restore an order dismissing a complaint unless the Criminal Procedure Code expressly confers such power, and the law declared by the Supreme Court binds all courts in pending proceedings under Article 141.