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Issues: (i) Whether the Supreme Court's later declaration that wheat and wheat products are different commodities under section 6-B of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 could be applied to pending and past assessment proceedings; (ii) whether a departmental circular issued earlier in support of the then-prevailing High Court view continued to bind the assessing and revisional authorities after the Supreme Court's contrary ruling; (iii) whether the Joint Commissioner could revise an order originally passed by an Assistant Commissioner who had later become a Deputy Commissioner.
Issue (i): Whether the Supreme Court's later declaration that wheat and wheat products are different commodities under section 6-B of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 could be applied to pending and past assessment proceedings.
Analysis: Once the Supreme Court declared the law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the earlier High Court view ceased to be good law. The declaration of law by the Supreme Court is binding on all authorities and courts, and it applies to all pending proceedings, regardless of the stage at which they are pending. The power to confine a ruling to future transactions is available to the Supreme Court alone and not to subordinate authorities or High Courts acting under the Act.
Conclusion: The later Supreme Court ruling was applicable, and the contention that it had only prospective effect was rejected.
Issue (ii): Whether a departmental circular issued earlier in support of the then-prevailing High Court view continued to bind the assessing and revisional authorities after the Supreme Court's contrary ruling.
Analysis: The circular had been issued only on the basis of the then-existing High Court decision. Once that decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, the foundation of the circular disappeared and it became ineffective. In any event, a circular issued under the sales tax law cannot control judicial or quasi-judicial decision-making where it conflicts with the law declared by the Supreme Court.
Conclusion: The circular did not survive the Supreme Court ruling and could not bar revision of the assessments.
Issue (iii): Whether the Joint Commissioner could revise an order originally passed by an Assistant Commissioner who had later become a Deputy Commissioner.
Analysis: The character of an order is determined by the office held at the time the order is passed. An order passed when the officer was Assistant Commissioner does not become an order of Deputy Commissioner merely because of a later promotion. The revisional power under section 21(2) extends to orders passed by an Assistant Commissioner or other subordinate officer and therefore covered the impugned order.
Conclusion: The Joint Commissioner had jurisdiction to revise the order, and the objection was rejected.
Final Conclusion: All three substantive challenges failed, and the common order under challenge was sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: A later declaration of law by the Supreme Court under Article 141 binds all pending proceedings and overrides contrary departmental circulars or earlier High Court views, while revisional jurisdiction attaches to the office that passed the order at the time of its making.