Revisional power under evacuee property law survives finality clauses, allowing reopening, no limitation bar, and no certiorari relief.

Section 28's finality clause did not exclude revisional power under Section 27 because both provisions operated within Chapter V, so the earlier non-evacuee order could be reopened. Section 7-A did not bar the proceedings where they were treated as pending on the relevant date, and the notice under Section 27 was not defeated by any limitation period because the Act prescribed none for that revisional power. The notice was also treated as valid within the custodial hierarchy, and certiorari was unavailable because the authorities acted within jurisdiction, including to examine allegations of fraud.

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Issues: (i) Whether the earlier order declaring the appellant a non-evacuee had become final so as to bar revision under Section 27 in view of Section 28 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950; (ii) Whether Section 7-A barred initiation of proceedings under Section 27; (iii) Whether the notice under Section 27 was barred by limitation; (iv) Whether the notice was invalid because it was not passed by the Custodian General; and (v) Whether certiorari could issue to quash the notice.

Issue (i): Whether the earlier order declaring the appellant a non-evacuee had become final so as to bar revision under Section 27 in view of Section 28 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.

Analysis: Section 28 makes orders final only subject to the express provisions contained in Chapter V. Since Sections 27 and 28 both occur in Chapter V, the revisional power under Section 27 is not excluded by the finality clause in Section 28.

Conclusion: The earlier order was not immune from revision under Section 27 and could be reopened.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 7-A barred initiation of proceedings under Section 27.

Analysis: The statutory bar in Section 7-A prevents declaration of evacuee property on or after the specified date, but the proviso saves proceedings that were pending on that date. As the proceedings concerning the property were treated as pending on the relevant date, the subsequent order in favour of the appellant did not attract the bar.

Conclusion: Section 7-A did not bar the notice or the proceedings under Section 27.

Issue (iii): Whether the notice under Section 27 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The revisional power under Section 27 is not curtailed by any prescribed limitation period in the Act. Delay by itself does not destroy the authority's jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of the earlier order.

Conclusion: The proceedings under Section 27 were not barred by limitation.

Issue (iv): Whether the notice was invalid because it was not passed by the Custodian General.

Analysis: The Act defines the Custodian General and the Custodian hierarchy broadly, and places the custodial authorities under the general superintendence and control of the Custodian General. The impugned notice was therefore treated as validly issued within the statutory framework.

Conclusion: The notice was not invalid on the ground urged.

Issue (v): Whether certiorari could issue to quash the notice.

Analysis: The authorities had jurisdiction to call for the record and examine the legality or propriety of the prior order, especially where fraud was alleged. Since the notice was within jurisdiction, there was no excess of jurisdiction or usurpation warranting certiorari.

Conclusion: Certiorari was not available to quash the notice.

Final Conclusion: The statutory authorities were competent to reopen the matter and proceed on the allegation of fraud, and no jurisdictional or legal bar was made out against the notice under Section 27.

Ratio Decidendi: A finality clause does not exclude revisional power where both provisions operate within the same chapter and the statute authorises examination of legality or propriety, and where jurisdiction exists, delay alone does not bar such proceedings or justify certiorari.

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