Mandatory appointment procedure controls ad hoc service rights; void appointment cannot justify injunction or salary relief.

An ad hoc appointment made for a short-term vacancy was held invalid where the mandatory statutory procedure was not followed, including prior intimation, selection in the prescribed manner, and prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools before appointment. The appointment was treated as void ab initio and incapable of creating any right to hold the post or claim salary. Because no enforceable right arose from a void appointment, an injunction to continue the employee in service and direct payment of salary was not maintainable, as such relief would conflict with the statutory scheme and the law governing specific relief.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff's ad hoc appointment was validly made in accordance with the statutory procedure for short-term vacancy under the education law and removal of difficulties order; (ii) Whether a decree of injunction could be granted to continue the plaintiff in service and direct payment of salary despite the alleged illegality of appointment.

Issue (i): Whether the plaintiff's ad hoc appointment was validly made in accordance with the statutory procedure for short-term vacancy under the education law and removal of difficulties order.

Analysis: The statutory scheme required the management to follow the prescribed procedure for filling a short-term vacancy, including prior intimation, selection in the manner laid down, and prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools before appointment. The appointment in question was not made in conformity with that mandatory procedure. The requirement of prior approval before appointment was treated as essential, and any appointment made in transgression of the prescribed procedure was held to be illegal and void ab initio.

Conclusion: The appointment was invalid and conferred no right to hold the post or claim salary.

Issue (ii): Whether a decree of injunction could be granted to continue the plaintiff in service and direct payment of salary despite the alleged illegality of appointment.

Analysis: Once the appointment was found to be void, the plaintiff had no enforceable right to continue in service or to receive salary from the State exchequer. Granting an injunction in such circumstances would amount to directing breach of statutory provisions. A contract of personal service is ordinarily not specifically enforceable, and the recognised exceptions were not attracted on these facts. The relief was therefore barred under the law of specific relief.

Conclusion: The injunction and consequential salary relief were not maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The lower appellate court's decree was set aside, the trial court's dismissal was restored, and the suit stood dismissed, with costs awarded throughout to the defendants-appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: An appointment made in violation of the mandatory statutory procedure and prior-approval requirement is void ab initio and cannot support an injunction for continuation in service or payment of salary.

---