Self-incrimination and equality challenges to customs summons power fail where inquiry targets smuggling prevention and revenue protection.

Article 20(3) does not bar Section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act because the protection against self-incrimination applies only to an accused person in criminal proceedings, while a customs inquiry is an investigative and administrative process. The provision was therefore held valid against that challenge. Article 14 was also not violated because persons having information or documents relevant to the prevention and detection of smuggling form a reasonable class, and the classification bears a rational nexus to the object of preventing customs evasion and protecting public revenue. The summons power under Section 171-A was accordingly upheld.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act is unconstitutional as offending Article 20(3) of the Constitution by compelling a person to give incriminating evidence in a customs inquiry; (ii) Whether Section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act is unconstitutional as violating Article 14 of the Constitution by creating an unreasonable discrimination.

Issue (i): Whether Section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act is unconstitutional as offending Article 20(3) of the Constitution by compelling a person to give incriminating evidence in a customs inquiry.

Analysis: The protection under Article 20(3) is confined to a person accused of an offence and to compulsion in relation to criminal proceedings. A customs inquiry under Section 171-A is an investigative and administrative process to detect smuggling and regulate import control; it is not, by its nature, a criminal trial or a proceeding that necessarily places the summoned person in the position of an accused. Even if answers obtained in such an inquiry may later reveal incriminating material, the constitutional bar operates at the stage of criminal prosecution, where compelled testimony cannot be used against the person. The section therefore does not by itself transgress the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.

Conclusion: Section 171-A does not violate Article 20(3) and is valid on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act is unconstitutional as violating Article 14 of the Constitution by creating an unreasonable discrimination.

Analysis: Article 14 permits classification if it is founded on an intelligible differentia and bears a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. Section 171-A applies to persons who may have information or documents relevant to the prevention and detection of smuggling. Persons connected with smuggling-related information form a distinct class, and the legislative object is to prevent evasion of customs laws and protect public revenue. The absence of the evidentiary immunity available in ordinary trial proceedings does not amount to hostile discrimination, because the section operates in a different field and for a different public purpose. The classification is neither arbitrary nor unrelated to the statute's object.

Conclusion: Section 171-A does not violate Article 14 and is valid on that ground.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional challenge to the summons power under Section 171-A failed, and the customs authority's action was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Article 20(3) protects only an accused person in criminal proceedings, and a statutory enquiry into smuggling may validly compel answers from persons having relevant information if the provision is supported by a reasonable classification connected to the object of preventing customs evasion.

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