Final order and later statute applied in execution: valuation rights were protected, and the 1939 moneylenders law governed the appeal.

An execution order dismissing an appeal from a valuation direction was treated as a final order because it finally affected the judgment-debtor's substantive right to have only sufficient property sold and to avoid sale below the court's valuation. The court also held that sections 13 and 14 of the Bihar Moneylenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939 were severable: the valuation requirement did not directly conflict with Order 21, Rule 66 CPC because the estimate could be communicated without being inserted in the sale proclamation. As the 1939 Act had received assent and was in force during the appeal, the appellate court applied the later law and granted relief under it.

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Issues: (i) Whether the order dismissing the appeal from the execution court's valuation order was a judgment, decree, or final order appealable to the Federal Court; (ii) Whether Sections 13 and 14 of the Bihar Moneylenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939 were repugnant to Order 21, Rule 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and whether the appeal had to be decided by reference to the new Act.

Issue (i): Whether the order dismissing the appeal from the execution court's valuation order was a judgment, decree, or final order appealable to the Federal Court.

Analysis: The majority held that the execution order affected a substantive right conferred on the judgment-debtor, namely the right to insist that only so much of the property as was sufficient to satisfy the decree be sold and that it should not be sold below the value fixed by the Court. The dismissal of the appeal by the High Court therefore finally denied that advantage and was not a mere procedural direction. The order was treated as finally determining rights between the parties for the purpose of appellate jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The order was appealable as a final order, and the appeal lay to the Federal Court.

Issue (ii): Whether Sections 13 and 14 of the Bihar Moneylenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939 were repugnant to Order 21, Rule 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and whether the appeal had to be decided by reference to the new Act.

Analysis: The majority held that Section 13, which required the execution court to estimate value, was distinct from Section 14, which dealt with the proclamation of sale, and that the two provisions were severable. Section 13 did not itself conflict with the Patna amendment to Order 21, Rule 66, because the estimate could be communicated otherwise than by inserting it in the proclamation. Since the 1939 Act had received the Governor-General's assent and came into force during the pendency of the appeal, the court could apply the law as it then stood, and the earlier challenge to repugnancy no longer survived.

Conclusion: The new Act governed the matter, there was no effective repugnancy invalidating the operative provision, and the appellant was entitled to relief under the 1939 Act.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, the adverse orders were set aside, and the matter was remitted for disposal in accordance with the Bihar Moneylenders (Regulation of Transactions) Act, 1939.

Concurring Opinion: Sulaiman J. dissented on maintainability and held that the High Court order was neither a judgment, decree, nor final order for the purpose of appeal. He further held, however, that if the appeal were maintainable, the case should be decided under the 1939 Act and the appellant should succeed on the merits.

Ratio Decidendi: A later statute validly assented to and in force during the pendency of an appeal may be applied by the appellate court, and a provision requiring valuation of property for execution is severable from a provision concerning sale proclamation where the two are not in direct conflict.

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