Rule-making power may validly define appellate authority and quorum, while writ courts avoid reweighing comparative merits.
Rules 189 and 190 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1964 were examined against the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, on the basis that the Act empowered the State Government to prescribe by rules the appellate forum and the manner of its functioning. The rules were treated as valid because they could authorise constitution of the appellate authority from among State Transport Authority members and provide for a quorum, without amounting to unauthorised sub-delegation. The commentary also notes that comparative assessment of applicants' merits and service record was viewed as a matter for the competent authority, and not one for reappreciation in writ jurisdiction absent jurisdictional error or legal infirmity.
Issues: (i) Whether Rules 189 and 190 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1964 were ultra vires on the ground that the Government could not authorise the Chairman of the State Transport Authority to constitute the appellate authority and fix a quorum for it; (ii) Whether, in the individual writ petition, the appellate authority's preference of one applicant over another on comparative merits and record could be interfered with in writ jurisdiction.
Issue (i): Whether Rules 189 and 190 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1964 were ultra vires on the ground that the Government could not authorise the Chairman of the State Transport Authority to constitute the appellate authority and fix a quorum for it.
Analysis: Sections 64 and 68(2)(j) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 empowered the State Government to prescribe by rules the authority to whom appeals would lie, as well as the manner in which that authority would function. The rule-making power was wide enough to specify the appellate forum, its composition, and the mode of constitution from among members of the State Transport Authority. The principle against sub-delegation did not apply so as to invalidate the rules, because the statute did not require the Government itself to nominate every member of the appellate authority. Rule 190, which permitted the authority to act with a quorum of two, was also within the rule-making power, since the Act left the manner of functioning to be prescribed by rules. The arrangement did not amount to an unauthorised abdication of legislative power.
Conclusion: The rules were held valid and not ultra vires.
Issue (ii): Whether, in the individual writ petition, the appellate authority's preference of one applicant over another on comparative merits and record could be interfered with in writ jurisdiction.
Analysis: The dispute turned on assessment of comparative merits, including service record and related factual considerations. The Court treated these as matters within the competence of the appellate authority and the Government, and not as issues for reappreciation in writ proceedings. No jurisdictional error or legal infirmity was shown that would justify interference.
Conclusion: The finding in favour of the selected applicant was not interfered with.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions failed on both the constitutional validity challenge and the merits challenge, and the impugned orders were left undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute authorises the Government to prescribe by rules the appellate authority and the manner of its functioning, the rules may validly provide for constitution of that authority from a designated collegium and for a quorum, and writ jurisdiction will not be used to reweigh comparative merits decided by the competent transport authority.
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