Statutory interpretation of "paper" under the Press and Registration of Books Act: printed notice not covered, so conviction failed.

The word "paper" in Section 3 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 was held not to clearly include a printed notice. Reading the provision in light of the Act's preamble and scheme, the Court rejected a literal construction that would extend it to invitations, notices and similar matter, as that would produce unreasonable and absurd results. Because a penal provision must be clear and unambiguous before a conviction can stand, the uncertainty here meant the conviction under Section 12 was not sustainable, and the acquittal was upheld.

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Issues: Whether the word "paper" in Section 3 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 included a printed notice so as to sustain the conviction under Section 12.

Analysis: The expression "paper" was not defined in the Act. A literal and ordinary meaning would extend the provision to printed invitations, notices and similar matter, producing unreasonable and absurd results. Reading the provision with the preamble and the scheme of the Act, the Court found that the enactment was primarily directed to books, newspapers and printed matter of literary, historical or cultural value, and that the word "paper" could not be treated as clearly encompassing every printed notice. The Court further held that a penal provision must be clear and unambiguous before a conviction can be sustained, and that such certainty was lacking here.

Conclusion: The word "paper" did not clearly include the printed notice, and the conviction under Section 12 was not sustainable. The acquittal was upheld.

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