1936 (8) TMI 2 - HC - Indian Laws

Distribution /= Publishing: Accused Acquitted under Press Act Section 12

Dattatraya Malhar Bidka Versus Emperor

Dattatraya Malhar Bidka Versus Emperor - AIR 1937 Bom 28 Issues:1. Whether the handbills distributed by the accused constitute an offense under Section 12 of the Press and Registration of Books Act.2. Whether the accused's act of distributing the pamphlets amounts to publication and thus an offense under Section 12.3. Whether the pamphlet distributed by the accused qualifies as a paper printed within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act.Analysis:1. The judgment discusses the reference made by the Sessions Judge regarding the conviction of the accused under Section 12 of the Act for distributing handbills. The Sessions Judge recommended setting aside the conviction, believing it was not justified. The accused distributed handbills regarding agriculturist meetings, which the Magistrate deemed non-compliant with Section 3 of the Act. The Court deliberates on whether the handbills distributed fall under the Act's purview. The Chief Justice opines that the accused did not publish the paper within the meaning of Section 12, focusing on the definition of 'publisher' under Sections 3 and 5. He emphasizes that the mere distributor or seller of a paper is not a publisher as intended by the Act, leading to the conclusion that the accused did not commit an offense under Section 12. The conviction is set aside, and the fine is to be repaid.2. Justice Wassoodew provides additional insights, emphasizing the importance of the accused's role as a distributor rather than a publisher. He highlights the ambiguity in interpreting Sections 3 and 12 of the Act and the necessity of strict construction in penal provisions. The judgment delves into whether the accused's act constitutes publishing the pamphlet under Section 12 and if the pamphlet qualifies as a paper printed under Section 3. Justice Wassoodew concludes that the accused, as a mere distributor, does not fall under the definition of a publisher as intended by the Act. He stresses that interpreting the term 'publisher' broadly to include distributors would lead to unintended consequences. The judgment asserts that the accused's conviction is erroneous, as he was not the publisher but a distributor, and accepts the reference, resulting in the accused's acquittal.3. The Court extensively discusses the interpretation of the term 'paper printed' under Section 3 of the Act. The Chief Justice and Justice Wassoodew both analyze the definition of 'paper' within the Act and its implications. They deliberate on whether the pamphlet distributed by the accused qualifies as a paper printed under Section 3. The judgment emphasizes that a distributor or seller of printed material does not fall under the definition of a publisher as intended by the Act. The Court concludes that the accused's act of distributing pamphlets does not amount to publishing within the meaning of the Act, ultimately leading to the acquittal of the accused based on the incorrect conviction under Section 12.