Statutory instalment rights and default relief under estate duty law cannot be ignored before penalty is imposed.

Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 may be invoked despite an alternative statutory appeal where the remedy is not efficacious, is onerous, or the challenge concerns jurisdictional error. Under the Estate Duty Act, section 70(2) gives the accountable person a statutory option to pay immovable-property duty in yearly or half-yearly instalments, and that mode cannot be altered by the Controller; section 70(1) is a separate discretionary postponement power. The Controller must also consider applications under section 73(4) to treat the person as not in default before imposing penalty, and penalty cannot be levied before the first instalment falls due.

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Issues: (i) Whether a writ petition under Article 226 was maintainable despite the statutory appeal remedy against penalty under the Estate Duty Act. (ii) Whether the accountable person had a statutory right under section 70(2) to pay estate duty in yearly instalments, and whether the Controller could change that mode to monthly instalments. (iii) Whether the Controller was bound to consider the applications under section 73(4) to treat the accountable person as not being in default before imposing penalty, and whether the penalty imposed before the first yearly instalment fell due was without jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether a writ petition under Article 226 was maintainable despite the statutory appeal remedy against penalty under the Estate Duty Act.

Analysis: The alternative remedy rule is a rule of self-restraint and does not bar writ jurisdiction where the statutory remedy is not efficacious, is oppressive, or where the challenge goes to jurisdiction or to a clear failure to exercise statutory power. Here, the appeal against penalty required prior deposit of the entire estate duty, which was far more onerous than the penalty itself. The impugned grievance also included non-appealable orders and allegations that the Controller had acted without jurisdiction and had failed to exercise discretion according to law.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable and the Court was justified in deciding the merits.

Issue (ii): Whether the accountable person had a statutory right under section 70(2) to pay estate duty in yearly instalments, and whether the Controller could change that mode to monthly instalments.

Analysis: Section 70(2) confers an option on the accountable person to pay immovable-property duty in four equal yearly instalments or eight equal half-yearly instalments. The mode is fixed by statute and is not alterable by the Controller. Section 70(1) is a separate discretionary provision for postponement, dependent on satisfaction that the duty cannot be raised without excessive sacrifice; no such finding was recorded, and the impugned order in substance proceeded under section 70(2). The Controller had no authority to substitute monthly instalments or reject the chosen yearly mode.

Conclusion: The petitioner's statutory option had to be respected, and the order directing monthly instalments was illegal and without jurisdiction.

Issue (iii): Whether the Controller was bound to consider the applications under section 73(4) to treat the accountable person as not being in default before imposing penalty, and whether the penalty imposed before the first yearly instalment fell due was without jurisdiction.

Analysis: The power under section 73(4) is a public duty requiring consideration of relevant materials and a reasoned exercise of discretion, especially where an appeal has been filed. The record showed repeated applications for being treated as not in default, but no reasoned disposal of those applications. Since the petitioner had opted for yearly instalments, no default could arise before the first yearly instalment became due. Penalty proceedings initiated and concluded before that date were premature and unsustainable.

Conclusion: The penalty order was invalid, the petitioner was not a defaulter at the relevant time, and the failure to consider the section 73(4) applications vitiated the action.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were quashed, the penalty was set aside, and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration of the pending applications under section 73(4) in accordance with law; if the appeal remained pending, the Controller could proceed only in conformity with the statute.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute confers a specific instalment option on the accountable person and imposes a duty on the authority to consider a request to be treated as not in default, the authority must exercise that discretion lawfully and cannot impose penalty before the statutory instalment period expires or before the request is reasoned out.

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