Criminal contempt and valid reference under contempt law: a lone tribunal member could not bind the bench, and no contempt was proved.
A criminal contempt reference under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act must be made by the subordinate court as a whole; a reference signed only by one member of a Division Bench of the Tribunal was not a valid reference, though the High Court could still treat the material as information and act suo motu. On the merits, criminal contempt requires strict proof of scandalisation, prejudice to proceedings, or obstruction of justice, and the representation and its reading in open court did not meet that standard. The contempt notices were discharged, with the Court expressing disapproval of the language used and reiterating the need for dignity and decorum in judicial forums.
Issues: (i) Whether a criminal contempt reference made by only one member of a Division Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal could be treated as a valid reference under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. (ii) Whether the acts complained of, including the representation made to the President of the Tribunal and the reading of its contents in open court, constituted criminal contempt.
Issue (i): Whether a criminal contempt reference made by only one member of a Division Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal could be treated as a valid reference under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Analysis: A reference under Section 15(2) contemplates a reference by the subordinate court itself. Where the Tribunal functions as a Division Bench, a reference signed and made only by one member, without concurrence of the other member, cannot be treated as a reference by the Tribunal as such. At the same time, the High Court is not denuded of power to act on the material as information and consider proceeding suo motu in an appropriate case.
Conclusion: The reference was not a valid reference by a subordinate court within Section 15(2), though the High Court could still consider the matter on its own motion.
Issue (ii): Whether the acts complained of, including the representation made to the President of the Tribunal and the reading of its contents in open court, constituted criminal contempt.
Analysis: Criminal contempt under Section 2(c) requires matter or an act that scandalises the court, prejudices or interferes with judicial proceedings, or obstructs administration of justice. Mere unpalatable language in a representation, without a clear and deliberate publication amounting to scandalisation or interference, does not automatically satisfy that standard. The surrounding circumstances, the confidential nature of the representation, and the fact that the proceedings arose from a dispute concerning conduct within the Tribunal were insufficient to establish a clear case of criminal contempt. Proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act being quasi-criminal, strict proof was required.
Conclusion: No criminal contempt was made out against the opposite parties.
Final Conclusion: The contempt notices were discharged and the proceedings ended without punishment, while the Court recorded disapproval of the language used in the representation and reiterated the duty of advocates to maintain dignity and decorum in judicial forums.
Ratio Decidendi: A Division Bench reference under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 must be made by the court as a whole, but absence of a valid reference does not prevent the High Court from acting suo motu on the material before it; however, criminal contempt can be sustained only on a clear, strict and quasi-criminal showing of scandalisation or interference with justice.
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