Unconditional acceptance and probationary status under customs law: posting requests do not negate acceptance, and probationers avoid the post-cessation bar.

An offer of appointment remained unconditionally accepted where the candidate accepted the appointment terms and merely requested a change in first posting, as a posting request did not amount to a conditional acceptance. On the statutory bar on appearance before CESTAT under Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, a Member discharged during probation was held not to be "ceasing to hold office" in the substantive sense, because probation is a trial period and service rules treated probationers and confirmed Members as distinct classes. The bar was therefore confined to Members who had held office substantively after confirmation, and the Tribunal's interpretation was treated as a plausible view.

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Issues: (i) whether the respondent's letters amounted to an unconditional acceptance of the offer of appointment, and (ii) whether a Member of CESTAT on probation can be said to be "ceasing to hold office" so as to attract the bar under Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (i): whether the respondent's letters amounted to an unconditional acceptance of the offer of appointment

Analysis: The terms of appointment and the place of first posting were distinct matters. The respondent accepted the offer of appointment and only sought a change of posting from Chennai to a place near Indore. A request regarding posting did not amount to a refusal of the offered terms or a condition precedent to acceptance.

Conclusion: The acceptance was unconditional.

Issue (ii): whether a Member of CESTAT on probation can be said to be "ceasing to hold office" so as to attract the bar under Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962

Analysis: Probation is a period of trial, and a probationer does not acquire a substantive right to the post or a lien on it. The service rules treated probationers and confirmed Members as distinct classes. Reading Section 129(6) with the recruitment rules, the expression "ceasing to hold office" was held not to include discharge during probation. The bar against appearance before the Tribunal was therefore confined to Members who had held office substantively after confirmation.

Conclusion: A Member discharged during probation is not covered by the bar in Section 129(6).

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal's view was held to be a plausible interpretation and no interference was warranted in writ jurisdiction, so the challenge to the Tribunal's order failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A probationer in a statutory tribunal does not hold the office in the substantive sense required to trigger a post-cessation professional bar, and a request regarding place of posting does not convert an acceptance of appointment into a conditional acceptance of the offer itself.

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