Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: Whether the petition under the inherent jurisdiction was maintainable to quash criminal proceedings at the stage before evidence was recorded, when the accused had an available remedy to seek discharge before the Magistrate.
Analysis: The challenge was held to be premature because the case was at the stage preceding consideration under section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The accused were left free to contest the prosecution evidence at the stage of section 244 and to seek discharge under section 245(1) if no case was made out. The existence of this specific statutory safeguard was treated as a sufficient remedy, and the inherent power under section 482 was held not to be the proper course where the grievance depended on facts and circumstances to be tested in the trial court. The proceedings were therefore not quashed in exercise of inherent jurisdiction.
Conclusion: The petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not maintainable at that stage and was dismissed as premature, leaving the petitioners to pursue the statutory remedy before the trial court.
Ratio Decidendi: The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court should not be invoked to quash pending criminal proceedings when the accused has an adequate specific remedy under the Code to seek discharge before the trial court and the matter depends on factual evaluation at the proper stage.