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Issues: (i) whether the High Powered Committee's recommendation for appointment of the Central Vigilance Commissioner was legally valid under the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003; (ii) whether the recommendation had to be unanimous; (iii) whether the President was bound to act independently of the constitutional scheme of aid and advice in making the appointment; and (iv) whether the appointment could be sustained in judicial review.
Issue (i): whether the High Powered Committee's recommendation for appointment of the Central Vigilance Commissioner was legally valid under the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.
Analysis: The statutory scheme treats the Central Vigilance Commission as an integrity institution created to supervise vigilance administration and perform anti-corruption functions. The recommendation under the proviso to Section 4(1) is not a mere formality, but a statutory duty requiring an informed decision based on relevant material having a nexus with the purpose of the Act. Institutional integrity and institutional competence are central considerations, and the deciding authority must assess whether the proposed appointee would be able to function effectively in that office. Relevant adverse material, including the pending criminal case and the earlier departmental notings recommending disciplinary action, was not considered in the decision-making process.
Conclusion: The recommendation was invalid and non-est in law.
Issue (ii): whether the recommendation had to be unanimous.
Analysis: The statutory provision does not create a veto in favour of any member of the High Powered Committee. In the absence of an express requirement of unanimity, the decision of the majority governs. The presence of the Leader of the Opposition was intended to introduce bipartisanship, not to confer an absolute blocking power. Section 4(2), which states that a vacancy does not invalidate the appointment, also negatives a unanimity requirement.
Conclusion: Unanimity was not required.
Issue (iii): whether the President was bound to act independently of the constitutional scheme of aid and advice in making the appointment.
Analysis: The statutory scheme of appointment under the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 does not exclude the constitutional framework under Articles 74 and 77. The President's action in such matters follows the constitutional process of aid and advice through the Council of Ministers. The special statutory structure relied upon did not displace that scheme.
Conclusion: The appointment was not insulated from the ordinary constitutional scheme of aid and advice.
Issue (iv): whether the appointment could be sustained in judicial review.
Analysis: Judicial review extends to the legality of the decision-making process, not the merits of the candidate's selection. Where the statutory authority fails to consider relevant material, takes into account only limited bio-data, or acts inconsistently with the object and policy of the Act, the decision is vitiated by arbitrariness. Since the process ignored material relevant to institutional integrity, the recommendation and the consequent appointment could not stand.
Conclusion: The appointment was liable to be quashed.
Final Conclusion: The statutory process for selecting the Central Vigilance Commissioner was found to be flawed because the decisive recommendation ignored relevant material and failed to apply the test of institutional integrity. The appointment was therefore set aside and the writ petitions succeeded.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory recommendation for appointment to an integrity institution must be based on all relevant material bearing on institutional integrity and competence; omission to consider such material vitiates the decision as arbitrary and unlawful.
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