Classification and rate of duty disputes lie to the Supreme Court, not the High Court, under the Central Excise Act.

A dispute that substantially concerns classification of the impugned activity and the consequential rate of duty falls outside the High Court's appellate jurisdiction under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Where the controversy is whether the assessee's activity is taxable under one category or another, the matter is treated as one involving classification and determination of the rate of duty, making the Supreme Court the proper forum under Section 35L. The High Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain the revenue's appeals, and the appeals were not maintainable before it.

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Issues: Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 to entertain the revenue's appeals involving the classification of the impugned activity and the consequential question of rate of duty, or whether the appeals lay exclusively to the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: The controversy turned on whether the activity rendered by the assessees was taxable as services of a practicing chartered accountant or under another taxable category, and therefore involved determination of the rate of duty and classification. Such questions fall within the statutory exception to the High Court's appellate jurisdiction under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The proper forum for deciding that issue is the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Conclusion: The High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeals and they were not maintainable before it.

Ratio Decidendi: A dispute that substantially involves classification and determination of the rate of duty is excluded from the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and lies exclusively before the Supreme Court under Section 35L of that Act.

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