Passport impounding and natural justice: prior hearing is ordinarily required, and public-interest satisfaction needs a rational nexus.

An already issued passport may not be impounded under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act, 1967 without prior observance of natural justice, because such action affects personal liberty and entails serious civil consequences; the availability of a later appeal does not by itself exclude a prior hearing, except in special cases of urgency or secrecy. The authority's satisfaction on "general public interest" is subject to limited judicial review to verify relevant material and a rational nexus with that ground; where the disclosed material is remote or speculative, the power is not properly exercised. On the stated material, the impounding order was quashed and directions were issued against acting on it.

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Issues: (i) whether the power to impound an already issued passport under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act, 1967 could be exercised without giving the holder a prior hearing; and (ii) whether the impounding order based on the ground of general public interest was supportable on the material disclosed.

Issue (i): whether the power to impound an already issued passport under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act, 1967 could be exercised without giving the holder a prior hearing.

Analysis: The order impounding a passport already granted affects personal liberty and has serious civil consequences. The language of Section 10(3)(c) does not expressly exclude the rule of audi alteram partem, and neither the subject-matter of the provision nor Section 10(5) compels such exclusion by necessary implication. The availability of an appellate hearing under Section 11(5) and the statutory scheme also support the view that a reasonable opportunity should ordinarily precede an adverse order, unless special circumstances such as urgency or secrecy are shown.

Conclusion: The impugned impounding order was invalid for breach of natural justice and prior hearing was required.

Issue (ii): whether the impounding order based on the ground of general public interest was supportable on the material disclosed.

Analysis: Although the authority's satisfaction under Section 10(3)(c) is not open to full appellate scrutiny, it is subject to limited judicial review to ascertain whether there was relevant material having a rational nexus with the stated ground. The material disclosed did not show any real connection between the petitioner's alleged irregularities and the prosecution of fraud cases in London, and the apprehended prejudice was found to be too remote and speculative. On that material, no reasonable body of persons could conclude that impounding the passport was necessary in the interests of the general public.

Conclusion: The order was unsustainable even on the basis of the disclosed material and the condition for exercise of power under Section 10(3)(c) was not satisfied.

Final Conclusion: The passport impounding decision was quashed and the respondents were restrained from acting on it, with costs awarded to the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: A passport already issued cannot be impounded under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act, 1967 without prior observance of natural justice, and the authority's satisfaction on public interest is open to limited judicial review to ensure the existence of relevant material with a rational nexus to that ground.

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