Holding over tenancy requires fresh statutory notice; waiver of defective quit notice must be intentional and conscious.

A tenancy created by holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is a fresh statutory tenancy, so a notice-dispensing clause in the original lease does not automatically carry forward to the renewed tenancy. In the absence of a specific agreement applicable to the holding-over tenancy, termination must comply with Section 106; for a manufacturing lease, that requires six months' notice expiring with the year of tenancy. Waiver of the right to challenge a defective quit notice requires intentional and conscious relinquishment of a known right, and cannot be inferred merely from silence or delayed pleading. On these principles, valid statutory notice remained necessary.

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Issues: (i) Whether a tenant holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is bound by the notice-dispensing clause in the original lease deed, or whether a fresh notice to quit under Section 106 is required. (ii) Whether the defendant waived its right to challenge the validity of the quit notice issued by the plaintiff.

Issue (i): Whether a tenant holding over under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is bound by the notice-dispensing clause in the original lease deed, or whether a fresh notice to quit under Section 106 is required.

Analysis: A tenancy by holding over is a new tenancy created by the operation of Section 116 and rests on the landlord's assent to the tenant's continuance in possession. The expression "agreement to the contrary" in Section 116 refers to the terms governing the renewed tenancy, not the original lease as such. While some terms of the earlier lease may continue by implication, a stipulation in the original lease dispensing with notice to quit does not automatically govern the statutory tenancy created after holding over. In the absence of a specific agreement applicable to the renewed tenancy, the tenancy must be determined in the manner prescribed by Section 106, and in the case of a manufacturing lease that means six months' notice expiring with the end of the year of tenancy.

Conclusion: The notice-dispensing clause in the original lease did not dispense with notice for the tenancy created by holding over, and a valid six months' notice under Section 106 was required in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the defendant waived its right to challenge the validity of the quit notice issued by the plaintiff.

Analysis: Waiver requires an intentional relinquishment of a known right with full knowledge of the relevant facts. Mere failure to reply to a defective notice, or omission to raise the objection at the earliest stage, does not by itself establish waiver. The objection that the notice was invalid raised in amendment of the written statement was a pure question of law and did not prejudice the plaintiff. The conditional order permitting amendment and awarding costs, once accepted, could not be used to infer waiver against the defendant. On the facts, there was no conscious abandonment of the right to insist on a valid statutory notice.

Conclusion: The defendant did not waive the right to challenge the validity of the quit notice, and the finding of waiver was against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The plaintiff could not recover possession without serving a valid notice to terminate the statutory tenancy, and the appeal succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: A tenancy created by holding over under Section 116 is a fresh tenancy, and unless the parties specifically agree otherwise for that renewed tenancy, it is terminable only in accordance with Section 106; waiver of the statutory notice requirement must be intentional and conscious, and cannot be inferred merely from silence or delayed pleading.

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