Protective rent law does not override express lease notice requirements absent clear statutory language.

Pending proceedings validly transferred to the Controller under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 were not divested of jurisdiction by the later deletion of section 29, because omission of a provision does not undo proceedings already lawfully pending unless a contrary intention appears. The landlord's eviction claim also failed because section 3 of the Act did not override the lease's express requirement of six months' notice ending with the term. As no such contractual notice had been given, eviction could not be maintained.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Controller retained jurisdiction over proceedings transferred to him under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 after deletion of section 29 by the Amendment Act of 1953. (ii) Whether the landlord could seek eviction without giving the six months' notice stipulated in the lease, in the light of section 3 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Issue (i): Whether the Controller retained jurisdiction over proceedings transferred to him under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 after deletion of section 29 by the Amendment Act of 1953.

Analysis: The deletion of section 29 did not affect proceedings already validly transferred and pending before the Controller. The omission of a provision does not, by itself, divest jurisdiction over matters already lawfully before the authority, absent a contrary intention. The pending suit therefore continued to be governed by the earlier transfer and the Controller was competent to proceed.

Conclusion: The Controller retained jurisdiction; this issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the landlord could seek eviction without giving the six months' notice stipulated in the lease, in the light of section 3 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

Analysis: The Act was held to be protective and restrictive, not enabling. Section 3 imposed additional conditions for eviction but did not destroy contractual rights under the lease or the general law. The proviso to clause 7 of the lease expressly required six months' notice ending with the expiry of the term before the tenant could be asked to vacate. The non obstante clause in section 3 did not dispense with that contractual notice requirement. Since no such notice had been given, the eviction claim could not succeed.

Conclusion: The landlord was bound to give the contractual six months' notice; this issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the respondents could not recover possession without first complying with the notice condition in the lease, and the suit for eviction was therefore not maintainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A protective rent statute that restricts eviction rights does not, by a general non obstante clause, override an express contractual notice requirement unless the statute clearly so provides; pending proceedings validly transferred under an omitted provision are not divested of jurisdiction merely by the provision's deletion.

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