Specific averments required for summoning a director in a criminal complaint; mechanical process orders cannot stand.
A criminal complaint cannot sustain summoning of an unnamed director unless it contains specific averments and supporting material showing a prima facie basis for that person's liability. The summoning court must independently apply its mind to the complaint, documents and record; a mechanical reference to "other Directors" without naming them or pleading their role is insufficient. Because the complaint did not set out facts connecting the petitioner to the alleged offence, the summoning order was unsustainable and was set aside.
Issues: Whether the summoning order issued against an un-named director, without specific averments in the complaint making him liable for the offence, could be sustained.
Analysis: Summoning an accused is not an empty formality and the court must be satisfied, on the complaint, documents and material on record, that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding. A mechanical order summoning persons described only as "other Directors" without naming them or setting out allegations showing their liability does not reflect the necessary application of mind. In a criminal complaint, the complainant must plead and establish the ingredients of the offence and the basis on which each accused is sought to be proceeded against; liability cannot be presumed in the absence of such averments.
Conclusion: The summoning order against the petitioner was unsustainable and was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded, and the process issued against the petitioner was quashed for want of proper pleadings and material connecting him to the alleged offence.
Ratio Decidendi: An accused cannot be summoned in a criminal complaint unless the complaint contains specific allegations and supporting material showing a prima facie basis for proceeding against that person, and the summoning court has independently applied its mind to those materials.
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