Parol evidence cannot vary a written assignment deed's consideration; default clause was cumulative, and limitation defect was cured.

A written assignment deed fixing consideration cannot be varied by oral evidence where the contractual terms are reduced to writing; a mere recital of payment may be challenged, but not the bargain itself. The default clause was treated as cumulative rather than exclusive, so it did not extinguish the obligation to pay the agreed consideration. The unpaid balance remained recoverable, though interest on that sum was not justified on the facts stated. A later order granting leave to sign and verify the plaint as agent was only an irregularity and related back to the suit's institution, so limitation did not bar the action.

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Issues: (i) Whether oral evidence was admissible to contradict the written deed as to the agreed consideration for the assignment. (ii) Whether the clause limiting the assignee's rights on default provided an exclusive remedy and whether the plaintiff was entitled to interest on the unpaid balance. (iii) Whether the suit was barred by limitation because leave to sign and verify the plaint as agent was obtained later.

Issue (i): Whether oral evidence was admissible to contradict the written deed as to the agreed consideration for the assignment.

Analysis: The deed did not merely contain a recital of payment; it set out the contractual terms of the assignment, including the total consideration and the rights and liabilities founded on that amount. Section 92 of the Evidence Act barred oral evidence to vary such written terms. A recital of fact as to payment could be disproved, but that did not permit a party to rewrite the contract by parol evidence. The authorities relied on did not justify departing from that distinction.

Conclusion: Oral evidence was not admissible to vary the contractual consideration fixed by the deed.

Issue (ii): Whether the clause limiting the assignee's rights on default provided an exclusive remedy and whether the plaintiff was entitled to interest on the unpaid balance.

Analysis: The default clause was construed as cumulative and not exclusive. It did not destroy the obligation to pay the agreed consideration, but merely provided a protective consequence if payment was withheld. On the claim for interest, the transaction did not attract relief under the claimed bases because the deed itself structured the parties' rights and burdens in a manner inconsistent with awarding interest as sought. The unpaid balance remained recoverable, but interest on that amount was not justified on the facts found.

Conclusion: The plaintiff was entitled to recover the unpaid balance, but not interest on that amount.

Issue (iii): Whether the suit was barred by limitation because leave to sign and verify the plaint as agent was obtained later.

Analysis: The plaint was presented within time and the omission to obtain prior leave was only an irregularity. The subsequent order granting leave related back to the institution of the suit and cured the defect. No substantive bar of limitation arose on that ground.

Conclusion: The suit was not barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: A decree was warranted for the unpaid balance under the written assignment, but the claim for interest failed, and the limitation objection was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a deed of assignment expressly reduces the contractual terms to writing, oral evidence cannot be admitted to vary the stated consideration; a mere recital of payment may be disproved, but not the contractual bargain itself, and a default clause will not be treated as an exclusive remedy unless that intention is clear.

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