Pleading-stage rejection under civil procedure barred where Section 41(h) defence needs evidence and disputed facts.

A plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure only where the statutory bar is clear from the plaint itself. If deciding the bar requires further inquiry, evidence, or resolution of disputed facts, rejection at the threshold is impermissible. On the pleadings, the plaintiffs asserted possession under an agreement and later compromise, and also preserved a right to seek specific performance. Whether an equally efficacious remedy existed, and whether the suit for injunction was barred by Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, could not be conclusively determined at that stage. The plaint was therefore not liable to rejection.

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Issues: Whether the plaint in the suit for permanent injunction was liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 on the ground that the suit was barred by Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Analysis: Rejection of a plaint at the threshold is permissible only when the bar of law is clear from the plaint itself. If the applicability of the statutory bar depends on further inquiry, evidence, or resolution of disputed facts, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d). On the materials pleaded, the plaintiffs asserted possession pursuant to the agreement and subsequent compromise, and also reserved their right to sue for specific performance. The question whether an equally efficacious remedy was truly available, and whether the injunction suit was hit by Section 41(h), could not be decided conclusively at that stage. The pleadings disclosed a debatable case requiring trial, and the suit could not be thrown out in limine.

Conclusion: The plaint was not liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the objection based on Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 failed.

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