Double jeopardy does not bar penalty for overlapping tax return delays; reasonable-cause findings remain factual in reference review.

Penalty for delayed filing of income-tax returns is a civil consequence for statutory default, so the constitutional protection against double jeopardy does not exclude overlapping periods of delay across different assessment years. Each year's failure to furnish a return in time is an independent default, even where the delay period overlaps. The Tribunal's finding that there was reasonable cause for the delay up to 12 February 1980 and for the later period was based on evidence and treated as a finding of fact. In reference jurisdiction, such factual findings are ordinarily not open to reassessment unless a distinct question of law arises.

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Issues: (i) Whether the doctrine of double jeopardy could be invoked to exclude overlapping periods of delay in filing income-tax returns for different assessment years while considering penalty under section 271(1)(a); (ii) Whether the Tribunal's finding that there was reasonable cause for the delay up to February 12, 1980 and for the later period was a factual determination beyond interference in a reference under section 256.

Issue (i): Whether the doctrine of double jeopardy could be invoked to exclude overlapping periods of delay in filing income-tax returns for different assessment years while considering penalty under section 271(1)(a).

Analysis: Penalty for failure to furnish a return in time is not prosecution for an offence, but a civil liability imposed for a statutory default. A subsequent failure to file a return in another year is an independent default, even if the period of default overlaps with an earlier year. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy, and the corresponding criminal-law principle, therefore does not govern assessment penalty proceedings in this context.

Conclusion: The plea of double jeopardy was inapplicable and the Tribunal was in treating the overlapping period as immune from penalty on that basis.

Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal's finding that there was reasonable cause for the delay up to February 12, 1980 and for the later period was a factual determination beyond interference in a reference under section 256.

Analysis: The existence of reasonable cause for delayed filing depended on appreciation of the material on record and the explanation offered by the assessee. In reference proceedings, the court could not reappreciate evidence to overturn such findings unless a specific question of law arose from them. The Tribunal's conclusion that the earlier accounts were not finalised and that the later period was also satisfactorily explained was treated as a finding of fact.

Conclusion: The factual findings were accepted and no referable question of law arose on that aspect.

Final Conclusion: The application for reference failed because the Tribunal's rejection of the Revenue's question did not disclose a referable question of law on the accepted factual findings, even though the Tribunal's reliance on double jeopardy was incorrect.

Ratio Decidendi: The constitutional bar of double jeopardy does not apply to penalty proceedings for continuing statutory defaults in income-tax returns, and findings on reasonable cause based on evidence are ordinarily questions of fact not open to reassessment in reference jurisdiction.

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