Statutory discretion in aircraft de-registration must be exercised independently; investigative requests are only relevant factors, not binding directions.

An investigating agency's request did not bind the aviation authority when considering de-registration of an aircraft; it was only a relevant factor unless the statute made it mandatory. Rule 30(6) of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 was treated as an enabling power requiring the authority to apply its own mind and exercise statutory discretion on relevant considerations, rather than deferring to an outside agency or refusing to decide because of pending investigation. The proper judicial response was to direct a lawful reconsideration of the request, not to command de-registration itself, because a court cannot dictate the substantive exercise of a statutory discretion.

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Issues: (i) Whether the request of the customs investigating agency could bind the aviation authority while considering de-registration of the aircraft; (ii) whether the aviation authority was required to exercise its statutory discretion under the aircraft registration rules and could not decline to decide the request merely because of the pending investigation; (iii) whether the proper relief was a direct mandamus to de-register the aircraft or a direction to decide the request in accordance with law.

Issue (i): Whether the request of the customs investigating agency could bind the aviation authority while considering de-registration of the aircraft.

Analysis: The customs provisions relied upon did not contain any mandate requiring the aviation authority to act on the investigating agency's instruction when considering de-registration. The communication from the investigating agency was only a request and could at best be a relevant circumstance for the authority to keep in mind while deciding the application.

Conclusion: The request of the investigating agency was not binding on the aviation authority.

Issue (ii): Whether the aviation authority was required to exercise its statutory discretion under the aircraft registration rules and could not decline to decide the request merely because of the pending investigation.

Analysis: Rule 30(6) of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 confers an enabling power to cancel registration in specified circumstances. The authority cannot refuse to exercise that power without cogent reasons or surrender its discretion to an outside agency. A statutory discretion coupled with a duty must be exercised according to law and on relevant considerations.

Conclusion: The aviation authority was bound to apply its own mind and take a reasoned decision under the rules.

Issue (iii): Whether the proper relief was a direct mandamus to de-register the aircraft or a direction to decide the request in accordance with law.

Analysis: A court cannot command a statutory authority to exercise discretion in a particular manner where the statute leaves the decision to that authority. The correct judicial response was to require the authority to decide the request lawfully and on relevant material, rather than to order de-registration itself.

Conclusion: The direct mandamus to de-register was not appropriate and the matter had to be reconsidered by the authority.

Final Conclusion: The appellate court declined to sustain the direction compelling de-registration, required the aviation authority to reconsider the request independently, and preserved the investigating agency's liberty to proceed in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute confers an enabling power to be exercised on relevant considerations, a court may require the authority to decide the matter according to law but cannot dictate the substantive outcome; an external investigative request is only a relevant factor unless the statute makes it binding.

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