Alternative employment for medically unfit drivers is discretionary, not a vested right, and must be considered case by case.

Regulation 17(3) was construed as giving the Corporation power, not imposing a duty, to offer alternative employment to a medically unfit driver: the first part authorises termination after failure of the fitness test, while the second is only an enabling provision for rehabilitation. The Court held that judicial review cannot compel a statutory authority to exercise discretion in favour of a particular person, though it may require lawful consideration. Circulars that excluded individual assessment were inconsistent with the statutory scheme, so the discretion had to be exercised case by case, reasonably and with regard to rehabilitation and administrative efficiency.

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Issues: Whether Regulation 17(3) of the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees (Other than officers) Service Regulations, 1981 confers a vested right to alternative employment on a driver found medically unfit, and whether the Court can direct the Corporation to offer such alternative employment in a particular manner.

Analysis: Regulation 17(3) was construed as having two distinct parts: the first authorises dispensing with the services of a driver who fails the medical fitness test, while the second gives the Corporation discretion to offer an alternative job. The latter was held to be a substantive enabling provision and not a mandatory proviso creating an enforceable right in favour of the employee. The Court further held that judicial review cannot compel a statutory authority to exercise discretion in a particular way or in favour of a particular person, though mandamus can require the authority to consider the matter according to law. Since the Corporation had adopted circulars that excluded individual consideration, it had effectively disabled itself from exercising the statutory discretion, and the discretion had therefore to be exercised case by case, reasonably, rationally, and with due regard to rehabilitation and administrative efficiency.

Conclusion: No vested right to alternative employment arose under Regulation 17(3), and the Court could not direct the Corporation to grant such employment as a matter of course. The Corporation was bound only to consider the respondents' cases individually and lawfully.

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