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Issues: Whether the limitation contained in section 33B(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 applied to a fresh revisional order passed by the Commissioner after the Tribunal had set aside the earlier order made within time.
Analysis: The limitation provision in section 33B(2) was construed in the light of the scheme of the Act and allied provisions. A revisional order under section 33B, once set aside by the Tribunal, could not be treated as a continuing order for all purposes. At the same time, the language of section 33B(2) was held capable of a construction confined to an order made suo motu in the first instance, and not extended to a subsequent order passed in obedience to the direction or order of a higher authority. The Court preferred the construction that avoided an absurd result whereby compliance with appellate directions would become impossible merely because time had elapsed since the original assessment order.
Conclusion: The limitation in section 33B(2) did not apply to the Commissioner's subsequent order made after the Tribunal had set aside the earlier order. The question was answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory limitation on the Commissioner's revisional power under section 33B(2) is to be construed as not defeating a fresh order passed in pursuance of a higher authority's direction where such a reading would produce an absurdity and frustrate the statutory scheme.