Supreme Court: Dismissal Not Void, but Illegal. Compensation ordered. Seek remedies under Section 33A or Section 10.

The Supreme Court held that the contravention of Section 33(2)(b) does not render the dismissal void but illegal. The Labour Court's orders for wage payment were treated as compensation. Workmen were advised to seek remedies under Section 33A or Section 10. The appeals were allowed, and costs were to be paid by the appellant. C.A. No. 2820 of 1977 was disposed of based on judgments in Civil Appeals Nos. 1375 and 1384 of 1977, setting aside the Labour Court's order due to the workman's lack of entitlement under Section 33C(2) without prior adjudication.

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Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of Sections 33(2)(b) and 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Effect of contravention of Section 33(2)(b) on an order of dismissal.
3. Jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33C(2).
4. Scope of inquiry under Section 33A.
5. Consequences of withdrawal of an application for approval under Section 33(2)(b).

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Interpretation of Sections 33(2)(b) and 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
The judgment examines the interpretation of Sections 33(2)(b) and 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 33(2)(b) mandates that during the pendency of any industrial dispute, an employer must seek approval from the Tribunal before dismissing a workman for misconduct not connected with the dispute. Section 33C(2) allows a workman to approach the Labour Court for determination and payment of wages due.

2. Effect of contravention of Section 33(2)(b) on an order of dismissal:
The principal question addressed is whether the contravention of Section 33(2)(b) renders an order of dismissal void and inoperative. The judgment concludes that such contravention does not render the dismissal void ab initio but merely illegal. The Labour Court does not have the jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) to entertain a claim for wages on the basis that the dismissal is void unless the order is set aside in an appropriate proceeding under Section 33A or Section 10.

3. Jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33C(2):
The Labour Court's jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) is limited to calculating the amount of money due to a workman or computing benefits in terms of money. It cannot entertain claims based on non-existing rights or adjudicate on the validity of a dismissal. The right to the money must be an existing one, already adjudicated upon or provided for.

4. Scope of inquiry under Section 33A:
Section 33A allows a workman to file a complaint if dismissed in contravention of Section 33. The Tribunal must then decide both the contravention of Section 33 and the merits of the dismissal. If the dismissal is justified on merits, the contravention is treated as a technical breach, and the dismissal stands. The inquiry under Section 33A involves a deeper scrutiny compared to the limited scope under Section 33.

5. Consequences of withdrawal of an application for approval under Section 33(2)(b):
The judgment differentiates between the withdrawal of an application for approval and its dismissal on merits. Withdrawal does not equate to refusal of approval. If an application is withdrawn, it is as if no application was made, and the dismissal does not become void. The workman cannot claim wages under Section 33C(2) without an adjudication setting aside the dismissal.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court held that the contravention of Section 33(2)(b) does not render the dismissal void and inoperative. The Labour Court's orders directing payment of wages were not set aside but treated as compensation. The workmen were advised to pursue remedies under Section 33A or Section 10. The appeals were allowed, and the costs were directed to be paid by the appellant as per the conditions of special leave.

C.A. No. 2820 of 1977:
This appeal was disposed of based on the judgment in Civil Appeals Nos. 1375 and 1384 of 1977. The Labour Court's order was set aside as the workman was not entitled to maintain an application under Section 33C(2) without prior adjudication. The appeal was allowed, and costs were directed to be paid by the appellant.

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